Abstract:
Using data of listed companies in China from 2004-2013, this paper studies how the VC networks affect the investment efficiency of listed companied backed by VCs. The findings are as follows: first, when network position is central, VC is more likely to restrict the underinvestment but promote the overinvestment; second, syndication will strengthen the effect of network position of VC on investment efficiency; third, after VC exits, the effect of network will disappear. Our findings suggest the VC networks will affect the action of VCs.
蔡宁, 何星. 社会网络能够促进风险投资的“增值”作用吗？——基于风险投资网络与上市公司投资效率的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2015, 426(12): 178-193.
CAI Ning HE Xing. Can Social Networks Improve the Value-added Effect of VC ? Based on the Relationship of Venture Capital Networks and Investment Efficiency. Journal of Financial Research, 2015, 426(12): 178-193.
Baker, M., and P. Gompers. 2003. “The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering.”Journal of Law & Economics, 46(2):569~598.
[13]
Baker, M., and P. Gompers. 2004. “An Analysis of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms.” Working Paper, Harvard University.
[14]
Barry, C. B., C. J. Muscarella, J. W. Peavy, and M. R. Vetsuypens. 1990. “The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence from the Going-public Process.” Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2): 447~471.
[15]
Bizjak, J., M. Lemmon, and R. Whitby. 2009. “Option Backdating and Board Interlocks.” The Review of Financial Studies, 22(11):4821~4847.
[16]
Brown,J.L.,and K.D.Drake. 2014. “Network Ties among Low-Tax Firms.” The Accounting Reivew, 89(2): 483~510.
[17]
Chiu, P., S. H. Teoh, and F. Tian. 2013. “Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion.” The Accounting Review, 88(3):915~944.
[18]
Fracassi, C. 2014. “Corporate Finance Policies and Social Networks.” Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin.
[19]
Freeman, L. C. 1979. “Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification.” Social Networks, 1(3):215~239.
[20]
Gompers, P. 1996. “Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry.” Journal of Financial Economics, 42(1): 133-156.
[21]
Granovetter, M. 1985. “Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of Embeddedness.” The American Journal of Sociology, 91(3):481~510.
[22]
Hellmann, T., and M. Puri. 2002. “Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical Evidence.” The Journal of Finance, 57(1):169~197.
[23]
Hochberg, Y., A. Ljungqvist, and Y. Lu. 2007. “Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance.” The Journal of Finance, 62(1):251~301.
[24]
Hochberg, Y., A. Ljungqvist, and Y. Lu. 2010. “Networking as A Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital.” The Journal of Finance, 65(3):829~859.
[25]
Jensen, M. 1986. “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers.” American Economic Review, 76(2):323~329.
[26]
Kaplan, S. N., and P. Stromberg. 2001. “Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring.” The American Economic Review, 91(2):426~430.
[27]
Lerner, J. 1994. “The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments.” Financial Management, 23(3):16~27.
[28]
Ljungqvist, A., M. Richardson, and D. Wolfenzon. 2005. “The Investment Behavior of Private Equity Fund Managers.” Working Paper, New York University.
[29]
Morsfield, S. G., and C. Tan. 2006. “Do Venture Capitalists Influence the Decision to Manage Earnings in Initial Public Offerings?” The Accounting Review, 81(5):1119~1150.
[30]
Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf. 1984. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors do not Have.” Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2):187~221.
[31]
Richardson, S. 2006. “Over-investment of Free Cash Flow.” Review of Accounting Studies, 11:159~189.
[32]
Stuart, T. E., and S. Yim. 2010. “Board Interlocks and the Propensity to be Targeted in Private Equity Transactions.” Journal of Financial Economics, 97:174~189.
