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金融研究  2017, Vol. 447 Issue (9): 178-191    DOI: 10.12094/1002-7246(2017)09-0178-14
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风险投资对上市公司股利政策影响的实证研究
吴超鹏, 张媛
厦门大学管理学院, 福建厦门 361005
The Impact of Venture Capital on the Dividend Policy of Listed Companies: Evidence from China
WU Chaopeng, ZHANG Yuan
School of Management,Xiamen University
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摘要 本文研究风险投资机构对我国上市公司现金股利政策的影响。研究发现:有风险投资背景的上市公司,现金股利的支付概率和支付水平都显著较高;高持股比例的风投机构,更可能增加公司的现金股利支付概率和水平。在全球金融危机期间,风险投资机构可以通过帮助企业缓解融资约束,从而对股利支付产生正面影响;参与董事会和短期套现压力较大的风险投资机构更可能发挥监督职能,从而更大幅度地提高公司的现金股利支付概率和水平。
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吴超鹏
张媛
关键词:  风险投资  股利政策  公司治理    
Abstract:  This paper examines the influence of venture capital on the dividend policy of listed companies. We find that venture capital backed listed companies are more inclined to pay cash dividend and have a higher dividend payment than non VC-backed companies. This effect is ever stronger when venture capitalists hold larger shareholding. During the financial crisis, venture capitalists could help companies loosen the financial constraints, and thus enhance their dividend payment. Venture capitalists which participate the board of directors, or which face short-term funding pressure are more likely to prompt the listed companies to increase the cash dividend payment.
Key words:  Venture Capital    Dividend Policy    Corporate Governance
JEL分类号:  G24   G35   G32  
基金资助: 福建省自然科学基金杰出青年项目(2010J06019),国家自科基金(71272082, 71232005, 71402156, 71532012, 71722012),教育部哲学社科重大课题攻关项目(15JZD019),教育部重点研究基地重大项目(16JJD790034)。
作者简介:  吴超鹏(通讯作者),管理学博士,教授,厦门大学管理学院,Email: wuchaopeng@xmu.edu.cn.
张媛,管理学硕士研究生,厦门大学管理学院,Email:zhangyuanxmu@gmail.com.
引用本文:    
吴超鹏, 张媛. 风险投资对上市公司股利政策影响的实证研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 447(9): 178-191.
WU Chaopeng, ZHANG Yuan. The Impact of Venture Capital on the Dividend Policy of Listed Companies: Evidence from China. Journal of Financial Research, 2017, 447(9): 178-191.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/10.12094/1002-7246(2017)09-0178-14  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2017/V447/I9/178
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