Beijing National Accounting Institute; School of Business, Renmin University of China; School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance & Economics
Abstract:
Considering the realistic background of China’s implementing the rule of law and innovation driven development strategy, this paper studies the influence of creditor protection on corporate innovation, by using the difference-in-difference approach which based on the quasi natural experiment about the implementation of the “bankruptcy law” and “property law” in 2007. We find that corporate innovation increases significantly among the enterprises with large external financing needs after the implementation of the “bankruptcy law” and “property law”, which illustrates the improvement of creditor protection promotes the innovation of enterprises positively. Further studies show that the positive correlation is more significant in companies with high innovation demand and low corporate governance level. Meanwhile the enterprises’ long-term debt increase and trade credit enhancement are important ways to promote the effect of creditor protection on corporate innovation. This study provides new evidence for the disputation on the relationship between creditor protection and corporate innovation, and it has important implications of improving the laws and regulations to protect investor rights, enhancing corporate innovation and adopting the strategy of innovation driven development.
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