The Effect of the Institutional Environment and Ultimate Control on CorporatePerformance: Based on the Test of Mediator Effect of Agency Costs
ZHEN Hongxian, ZHANG Xianzhi, CHI Guotai
School of Accounting/China Internal Control Research Center,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics; Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology
Abstract:
Existing literatures mostly use the analysis of the “black box” model, that is, deduce the role of governance mechanism from the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance reversely. This paper takes the agency cost as the breakthrough point, and reveals the operation mechanism inside the “black box” to some extent, by analyzing different paths of two types of agency costs between ultimate control, institutional environment and corporate performance. Empirical results are as follows: first of all, the concentration on ultimate control could decrease two types of agency costs, and improve the governance efficiency, therefore improve the corporate performance of listed companies. Secondly, at this stage the institutional environment has a significant effect on corporate performances of private listed companies. Thirdly, there is an interaction effect between ultimate control and institutional environment, as the environment is worse, the concentration on ultimate control could dramatically improve corporate performances. Last but not least, ultimate control owned by state could better solve the first and second types of agency problems, therefore have positive mediator effect on corporate performances. The research shows that the concentration on ultimate control and ultimate control owned by state may play a part alternative role in the protection of investors at this stage, in the environment without a perfect investor protection mechanism in our country.
甄红线, 张先治, 迟国泰. 制度环境、终极控制权对公司绩效的影响——基于代理成本的中介效应检验[J]. 金融研究, 2015, 426(12): 162-177.
ZHEN Hongxian, ZHANG Xianzhi, CHI Guotai. The Effect of the Institutional Environment and Ultimate Control on CorporatePerformance: Based on the Test of Mediator Effect of Agency Costs. Journal of Financial Research, 2015, 426(12): 162-177.
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