Abstract:
Existing literature is limited to investigating VAT transformation’s overall impact on corporate investment. While group affiliation is an important factor in investment behavior, there is no research analyzes the different influence of VAT transformation on investment from this perspective. We find that fixed-asset investment scale of group firms is significantly higher than that of independent firms. With the separation of ownership and control increases, it results in greater difference. Dynamics analysis finds that financial constraints is the main factor of both firms’ investment behavior. With the separation of ownership and control increases, agency cost affects investment behavior more, especially on group firms. Besides, over-investment of group firms is significantly higher than that of independent firms during VAT transformation.
倪婷婷, 王跃堂. 增值税转型、集团控制与企业投资[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 427(1): 160-175.
NI Tingting, WANG Yuetang. VAT Transformation, Group Affiliation and Corporate Investment. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 427(1): 160-175.
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