Abstract:
This paper surveys the effect of guarantee network on firm performance, its transmission channel and institutional causes. Results show that guarantee network has negative effect on firm performance. The transmission channel shows that network induces firms’ excessive investment and opportunistic behavior of the blockholers. When government intervention is higher or market level of financial institution is lower, the effect of guarantee network on firm performance and opportunistic behavior of the blockholers will be larger, and the incentives of bad firms participating in guarantee will be higher. These results indicate that government intervention on firms’ guarantee policy and lower market level of financial institution will lead to forging and abuse of social network when social network is embedded in formal finance, thus suppressing the information function of guarantee. This paper has some implications for both practice of commercial banks and how to seek benefit and avoid disadvantages of social capital.
曹廷求, 刘海明. 信用担保网络的负面效应:传导机制与制度诱因[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 427(1): 145-159.
CAO Tingqiu, LIU Haiming. The Flip Side of Guarantee Network: Transmission Channel and Institutional Causes. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 427(1): 145-159.
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