Summary:
At present, attracted by the higher returns in the financial industry, China's industrial sector is engaging more shadow banking activities. Material production, employment absorption and technological innovation are drivers of economic growth. Therefore, funds being diverted out of the real economy inevitably reduces investments in research and development, which is not conducive to the stability of China's financial market and the real economy. The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China stressed that “deepen institutional reform in the financial sector, make it better serve the real economy” and “improve the financial regulatory system to forestall systemic financial risks” .Therefore, identifying the macroeconomic aspects of shadow banking by non-financial enterprises is of great theoretical and practical significance for serving the real economy. Understanding these factors will help to prevent funds being diverted out of the real economy and promote the long-term and stable development of the economy. We analyze the impact of financial mismatch on shadow banking by non-financial enterprises from a theoretical perspective and consider the possibility of heterogeneous effects in different regions and for different companies. Next, we analyze the mechanism behind the effect of financial mismatch on shadow banking. Finally, we construct an empirical model and use data on non-financial listed companies from 2004 to 2015 to test the relationship between financial mismatch and non-financial enterprises' shadow banking behavior. We make three contributions to the literature. First, this article is the first to explain the increasing trend of non-financial firms' use of shadow banking and the decline in the entity investment rate from the perspective of financial mismatch. Second, we investigate the impact of financial mismatch on shadow banking and allow for heterogeneity at the regional and enterprise levels. Allowing for heterogeneity has important theoretical significance for deepening and extending our conclusions. Third, we use the intermediary effect model to analyze the mechanism behind the impact of financial mismatch on the extent of a firm's use of shadow banking, supplementing theoretical understanding of the macroeconomic impact of shadow banking activities. Our conclusions show that increasing the level of financial mismatch generally promotes the scale of shadow banking by non-financial enterprises, but that this effect is only significant in regions with greater financial deepening and fewer market-driven financial activities. Zombie companies and less profitable companies are affected by the “profit chase” and “investment substitution” mechanisms. The increase in the level of financial mismatch plays a stronger role in promoting enterprises' use of shadow banking. A second conclusion is that an increase in financial mismatch depresses productive investments; this effect is more significant for enterprises with higher capital specificity. Third, the results of the intermediary effect model show that financial mismatch mainly affects corporate investment behavior through financing constraints rather than through the channel of the return on capital. Financial mismatch also increases the scale of a firm's shadow banking by reducing the scale of its corporate entity investment. We show that financial mismatch is the root cause of the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises, industry hollowing and systematic risk accumulation. Financial mismatch reduces real investments and drives funds being diverted out of the real economy, which is not conducive to the long-term and sustainable development of the economy. To suppress the over-development of the shadow credit market and make financial sector better serve the real economy, it is important to improve the allocation efficiency of financial resources between different economic entities, alleviate credit discrimination by financial intermediaries and accelerate the development of capital markets.
韩珣, 李建军. 金融错配、非金融企业影子银行化与经济“脱实向虚”[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 482(8): 93-111.
HAN Xun, LI Jianjun. Financial Mismatch, the Shadow Banking Activities of Non-Financial Enterprises and Funds Being Diverted Out of the Real Economy. Journal of Financial Research, 2020, 482(8): 93-111.
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