Management Selling, Suppression of Information and Stock Price Crash Risk
SUN Shuwei, LIANG Shangkun, RUAN Gangming, FU Yuxiang
School of Accountancy, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics;School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics; School of Accountancy, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;Shanghai International Trust Co., Ltd.
Abstract:
In the post-financial crisis period, the stock price crisis has been a focus in the field of theory and practice. Using a large sample of management selling from 2007 to 2013, we investigate whether and how management selling leads to increased risk of stock price crash. We find that: (1) the risk of listed company’s stock price crash is positively associated with the value of management selling, (2) for firms with stronger selling incentive and greater selling utility, the risk of stock price crash is more significantly influenced by management selling, (3) to identify the channel: we document that management has incentive to bury the bad news before the stock selling, and eventually cause stock price crash risk. This paper provides the direct evidence to the cause of stock price crash.
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