Abstract:
This paper empirically tests the impact of fund ownership by using the data of China' s non-financial listed firms during the period of 2009-2017, and compares two mechanisms, “monitoring managers” or “restricting tunneling”. We find that: (1) the equity ownership by funds has a significant positive effect on listed firms' value, and the effect is stronger in firms where the controlling shareholders held a higher proportion of stock; (2) not only active and passive funds significantly increase the firms' value, quasi index funds also increase the firms' value; (3)the number of funds holding stock in the firm can significantly enhance the firm value, while the impact of fund ownership significantly decreases when controlling the number of funds. These results suggest the main contributing mechanism of the fund in China is more likely to be restricting the controlling shareholder's expropriation, instead of monitoring managers.
曾志远, 蔡东玲, 武小凯. “监督管理层”还是“约束大股东”？基金持股对中国上市公司价值的影响[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 462(12): 157-173.
ZENG Zhiyuan, CAI Dongling, WU Xiaokai. “Monitoring Managers” or “Restricting Tunneling”？ The Effect of Fund' s Holding on Firm Value in China. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 462(12): 157-173.
[1]陈冬华、 陈信元和万华林,2005,《国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费》,《经济研究》第2期,第92～101页。 [2]洪剑峭和薛皓,2009,《股权制衡如何影响经营性应计的可靠性——关联交易视角》,《管理世界》第1期,第153～161页。 [3]姜付秀、马云飙和王运通,2015,《退出威胁能抑制控股股东私利行为吗？》,《管理世界》第5期,第147～159页。 [4]姜国华和岳衡,2005,《大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究》,《管理世界》第9期,第119～126+157+171～172页。 [5]李春涛、薛原和惠丽丽,2018,《社保基金持股与企业盈余质量:A股上市公司的证据》,《金融研究》第7期,第124～142页。 [6]李维安和李滨,2008,《机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究——基于CCGI～(NK)的经验研究》,《南开管理评论》第1期,第4～14页。 [7]刘京军和徐浩萍,2012,《机构投资者:长期投资者还是短期机会主义者？》,《金融研究》第9期,第141～154页。 [8]刘少波,2007,《控制权收益悖论与超控制权收益——对大股东侵害小股东利益的一个新的理论解释》,《经济研究》第2期,第85～96页。 [9]娄伟,2002,《基金持股与上市公司业绩相关性的实证研究》,《上海经济研究》第6期,第58～62页。 [10]石美娟和童卫华,2009,《机构投资者提升公司价值吗？——来自后股改时期的经验证据》,《金融研究》第10期,第150～161页。 [11]史金艳、刘芳芳、 戴望秀和李延喜,2012,《基金持股行为特征与上市公司绩效——来自中国资本市场2005～2011年面板数据的经验证据》,《系统工程》第10期,第10～18页。 [12]唐清泉、罗党论和王莉,2005,《大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据》,《中国会计评论》第1期,第63～86页。 [13]唐跃军和宋渊洋,2010,《价值选择VS.价值创造——来自中国市场机构投资者的证据》,《经济学(季刊)》第2期,第609～632页。 [14]王甄和胡军,2016,《控制权转让、产权性质与公司绩效》,《经济研究》第4期,第146～160页。 [15]翁洪波和吴世农,2007,《机构投资者、公司治理与上市公司股利政策》,《中国会计评论》第3期,第367～380页。 [16]武常岐和钱婷,2011,《集团控制与国有企业治理》,《经济研究》第6期,第93～104页。 [17]肖星和王琨,2005,《证券投资基金:投资者还是投机者？》,《世界经济》第8期,第75～81页。 [18]杨墨竹,2008,《证券市场机构投资者投资行为分析》,《金融研究》第8期,第133～144页。 [19]杨瑞龙,1997,《论国有经济中的多级委托代理关系》,《管理世界》第1期,第107～116页。 [20]姚颐、刘志远和相二卫,2011,《中国基金在投资中是否追求了价值？》,《经济研究》第12期,第45～58页。 [21]俞红海、徐龙炳和陈百助,2010,《终极控股股东控制权与自由现金流过度投资》,《经济研究》第8期,第103～114页。 [22]祝继高和王春飞,2012,《大股东能有效控制管理层吗？——基于国美电器控制权争夺的案例研究》,《管理世界》第4期,第138～152+158页。 [23]祝继高、叶康涛和陆正飞,2015,《谁是更积极的监督者:非控股股东董事还是独立董事？》,《经济研究》第9期,第170～184页。 [24]Admati, A. R., P. Pfleiderer, J. Zechner. 1994. “Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium.” Journal of Political Economy, 102(6), 1097～1130. [25]Aghion, P., J. Van Reenen, L. Zingales. 2013. “Innovation and Institutional Ownership.” American Economic Review, 103(1), 277. [26]Appel, I. R., Gormley, T. A., Keim, D. B. 2016. “Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners. ” Journal of Financial Economics, 121(1), 111～141. [27]Bushee, B. J. 1998. “The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior.” Accounting Review, 73(3), 305～333. [28]Bird, A., Karolyi, S. A. 2016. “ Do Institutional Investors Demand Public Disclosure？. ” The Review of Financial Studies, 29(12), 3245～3277. [29]Boone, A. L., J. T. White. 2015. “The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production. ” Journal of Financial Economics, 117(3), 508～533. [30]Chen, J., H. Hong, J. C. Stein. 2002. “Breadth of Ownership and Stock Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics, 66(2), 171～205. [31]Cornett, M. M., A. J. Marcus, A. Saunders, H. Tehranian. 2007. “The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Corporate Operating Performance.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(6), 1771～1794. [32]Crane, A. D., Michenaud, S., Weston, J. P. 2016. “The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: Evidence from Index Thresholds. ” The Review of Financial Studies, 29(6), 1377～1408. [33]Del Guercio, D., J. Hawkins. 1999. “The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism.” Journal of Financial Economics, 52(3), 293～340. [34]Jensen, M. C., W. H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305～360. [35]Jiang, G., C. M. Lee, H. Yue. 2010. “Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The China Experience.” Journal of Financial Economics, 98(1), 1～20. [36]Kahn, C., A. Winton. 1998. “Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention.” The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 99～129. [37]Kang, J. K., Luo, J., Na, H. S. 2018. “Are Institutional Investors with Multiple Blockholdings Effective Monitors？. ” Journal of Financial Economics, 128(3), 576～602. [38]Maug, E. 1998. “Large Shareholders as Monitors: is there a Trade‐off between Liquidity and Control？” The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 65～98. [39]McConnell, J. J., H. Servaes. 1990. “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value.” Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 595～612. [40]Morck, R., A. Shleifer, R. W. Vishny. 1988. “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Financial economics, 20, 293～315. [41]Porta, R., F. Lopez‐de‐Silanes, A. Shleifer. 1999. “Corporate Ownership around the World.” The Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471～517. [42]Schmidt, C., R. Fahlenbrach. 2017. “Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value？ ”. Journal of Financial Economics, 124(2), 285～306. [43]Shleifer, A., R. W. Vishny. 1986. “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.” The Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461～488. [44]Shleifer, A., R. W. Vishny. 1997. “A Survey of Corporate Governance.” The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737～783. [45]Stock, J. H., M. Yogo. 2005. “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression.” Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg. [46]Ward, C., Yin, C., Zeng, Y. 2018. “Institutional Investor Monitoring Motivation and the Marginal Value of Cash. ” Journal of Corporate Finance, 48, 49～75. [47]Yuan, R., J. Z. Xiao, H. Zou. 2008. “Mutual Funds' Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from China.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(8), 1552～1565.
