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金融研究  2017, Vol. 445 Issue (7): 175-191    DOI: 10.12094/1002-7246(2017)07-0175-17
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预售众筹与股权众筹的选择: 基于众筹平台与企业家声誉的视角
刘波, 刘彦, 赵洪江, 冷梦玥
电子科技经济与管理学院,四川成都 611731;
遂宁银行,四川遂宁 629000
The Choice between Pre-sale Crowdfunding and Equity Crowdfunding:A Reputation Perspective
LIU Bo, LIU Yan, ZHAO Hongjiang, LENG Mengyue
School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China;Suining Bank
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摘要 本文研究了众筹平台与企业家的声誉对预售众筹与股权众筹这两种众筹模式选择的影响及其经济机理,在发现众筹平台和企业家声誉对发起预售众筹与股权众筹的正向促进作用基础上,比较并提出了两种众筹模式的选择条件:(1)当产品质量较好而股权众筹投资者却并不偏好产品时,无论众筹平台声誉如何,预售众筹均占优,而企业家声誉有助于进一步加强预售众筹的优势;(2)当股权众筹投资者偏好产品而启动资金需求小时,若平台声誉弱,起投门槛低的股权众筹占优,若平台声誉高,则预售众筹占优;(3)当股权众筹投资者偏好产品而启动资金需求大时,无论众筹平台与企业家声誉如何,起投门槛低的股权众筹均占优;(4)当股权众筹投资者偏好产品而启动资金需求适中时,若企业家声誉较弱且平台声誉较弱,股权众筹占优;若企业家声誉较弱且平台声誉较强,预售众筹占优;若企业家声誉较强时,无论平台声誉如何变化,股权众筹均占优。
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刘波
刘彦
赵洪江
冷梦玥
关键词:  预售众筹  股权众筹  平台声誉  企业家声誉    
Abstract:  This paper extends Belleflamme et al. (2014) and Kumar et al. (2016) by incorporating the roles of reputations of the crowdfunding platform and entrepreneur as a novel angle to study how they influence the entrepreneur's choice between the pre-sale crowdfunding and equity crowdfunding and its economic mechanism. Based on our first finding of the positive impact of reputations on the launch of pre-sale crowdfunding and equity crowdfunding, we further propose the choice criteria between two crowdfunding patterns: (1)when the product quality is high but the equity crowdfunding investors do not prefer the product itself, the pre-sale crowdfunding will be a dominant strategy regardless of the crowdfunding platform's reputation, and the entrepreneur's reputation will strengthen this dominance; (2) when the equity crowdfunding investors prefer the product itself and the initial start-up capital requirement is relatively smaller, the entrepreneur's choice will be influenced by platform reputation, i.e., equity crowdfunding with low barrier to entry dominates when platform's reputation is weaker; otherwise, pre-sale crowdfunding dominates;(3) when the equity crowdfunding investors prefer the product itself but the initial start-up capital requirement is relatively larger, equity crowdfunding with low barrier to entry will always dominate regardless of the reputations; (4) when the equity crowdfunding investors prefer the product itself and the initial start-up capital requirement is moderate, equity crowdfunding with low barrier to entry will dominate either if both platform's reputation and entrepreneur's reputation are weaker or if entrepreneur's reputation is stronger despite the platform's reputation, while pre-sale crowdfunding will dominate if entrepreneur's reputation is weaker but platform's reputation is stronger.
Key words:  Pre-sale Crowdfunding    Equity Crowdfunding    Crowdfunding Platform's Reputation    Entrepreneur's Reputation
JEL分类号:  L1   G23   G32  
基金资助: 国家自然科学基金项目(71373036;71573033)和四川省科技支撑计划项目(2013GZ0116)。
作者简介:  刘波,博士,教授,电子科技大学经济与管理学院,Email: Liub@uestc.edu.cn.刘彦,遂宁银行,Email:liuyan@snccb.com.赵洪江,博士,副教授,电子科技大学经济与管理学院,Email:zhaohj@uestc.edu.cn.冷梦玥,电子科技大学经济与管理学院, Email: 1016311786@qq.com.
引用本文:    
刘波, 刘彦, 赵洪江, 冷梦玥. 预售众筹与股权众筹的选择: 基于众筹平台与企业家声誉的视角[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 445(7): 175-191.
LIU Bo, LIU Yan, ZHAO Hongjiang, LENG Mengyue. The Choice between Pre-sale Crowdfunding and Equity Crowdfunding:A Reputation Perspective. Journal of Financial Research, 2017, 445(7): 175-191.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/10.12094/1002-7246(2017)07-0175-17  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2017/V445/I7/175
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