摘要 合格境外机构投资者(QFII)为上市公司提供了一个来自境外的特殊且专业的监督力量。本文利用2006-2015年中国A股上市公司数据,并采用Kim and Verrecchia(2001)的方法测度信息披露质量,发现QFII持股与公司信息披露质量显著正相关。在使用PSM-DID、安慰剂检验、工具变量法和反向因果识别来缓解内生性后,本文证明了QFII持股与公司信息披露之间存在因果关系,说明QFII已经成为一种重要的外部治理力量。分样本研究发现,QFII持股对信息披露质量的改善作用对内部治理较好和被“四大”审计的公司更加明显。最后,机制检验发现QFII可以通过增加持股公司的分析师跟踪人数和高管薪酬业绩敏感性来改善信息披露质量。因此,增加QFII的数量和逐渐放松资本项目管制有助于改善信息环境和保护中小股东权益,进而促进我国资本市场的健康发展。
Abstract:
Qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) may play an important role as external monitoring power in a market with strict capital account regulation. Using a data set of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2015, and following the method of Kim and Verrecchia (2001) to measure the information disclosure quality, we find a positive correlation between QFII ownership and firm’s information disclosure quality. After controlling for endogeneity problems with Difference-in-Differences approaches, placebo test, instrumental variable method and reverse causal test, we find that the QFII have a positive, causal effect on firm’s information disclosure, which suggests that QFII ownership is an external corporate governance mechanism in China. Moreover, we find that the impact is more pronounced for firms with better governance mechanisms and audited by international Big 4 auditing firms. Finally, we find that QFII can enhance corporate information disclosure through channels such as increased analyst coverage and higher pay-performance sensitivity of executives. Thus, increasing the number of QFII and gradually relaxing the capital account regulation can benefit firms’ information disclosure, thus to protect the interests of small and medium sized shareholders and promote a healthy development of China's capital market.
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