Abstract:
This paper studies region-based peer effects of China's listed firms' excess leverage, the mechanism and influence factors, and their potential economic consequences. Empirical results show that the excess leverage of China's listed companies is different in different regions from 2009 to 2016. After ruling out possible explanations involving firm and region specifications as well as sorting effects, we document the region-based peer effects of excess leverage of China's listed firms. Whether a firm has an excess leverage or not correlates positively with the proportion of excess leveraged firms in its located region, and a firm's excess leverage correlates positively with the excess leverage index of its located region. The mechanism of region-based peer effects of excess leverage is the imitating behaviors of non-leader firms, less-constrained firms and firms with lower degree centrality. Region marketization, financial development, and executives' financial background have significant impacts on the region-based peer effects of excess leverage. The impacts of region-based peer effects of excess leverage on firms include considerably higher excess leverage, weaker debt paying ability, higher excess investment and lower profitability.
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