Please wait a minute...
金融研究  2021, Vol. 492 Issue (6): 170-188    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
基金网络能够提高投资绩效吗?
陈胜蓝, 李璟
浙江工业大学经济学院,浙江杭州 310023;
内蒙古大学经济管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特 010021
Can Fund Networks Improve Investment Performance?
CHEN Shenglan, LI Jing
School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Technology;
School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University
下载:  PDF (763KB) 
输出:  BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)      
摘要 基金网络在金融市场的信息流动中发挥着重要作用。本文利用基金共同持股关系构建了一个有效的基金网络数据集,以中国资本市场股票型基金2005-2018年季度数据为研究样本,考察基金网络是否以及如何影响投资绩效。结果表明,基金在基金网络中越处于网络中心地位,基金的投资绩效越高。使用基金家族网络作为工具变量缓解内生性偏误后,基金网络仍然对投资绩效具有显著的正向影响。进一步地,本文考察了基金网络影响投资绩效的渠道,结果表明,基金网络主要通过提高基金的选股技能、资产配置技能和管理技能影响投资绩效。最后,本文考察了基金网络对基金市场份额的影响,研究发现基金网络会显著提高基金的市场份额,对基金在市场上的占有率有积极的正向影响。
服务
把本文推荐给朋友
加入引用管理器
E-mail Alert
RSS
作者相关文章
陈胜蓝
李璟
关键词:  机构投资者  基金网络  投资绩效  信息扩散效应    
Summary:  Institutional investors managing public funds are rapidly becoming a crucial part of financial markets. Accordingly, there is widespread interest in how these fund managers make investment decisions. Recent studies show that due to the complementarity of information structures, social networks play an important role in fund managers' asset allocation and diversification decisions. We focus on how an important social network-enabled interaction between funds—the fund holdings network—affects the investment performance of funds.
There are different theoretical perspectives on how a fund's co-ownership network affects investment performance. On the one hand, such networks produce information diffusion effects, and fund managers at the center of a fund network will receive signals earlier and obtain more valuable information than fund managers at the periphery of the network. Furthermore, the information held by fund managers at the center of the network will be more accurate, which will have a positive impact on the investment performance of their funds. On the other hand, a fund network can induce the “free riding on friends” effect. Compared with fund managers at the periphery of the network, fund managers at the center of the network support more “free riders”. Under this condition, the fund network may have a negative impact on their fund performance.
We use data on China's capital market stock funds from January 2005 to September 2018 to examine the impact of fund networks on investment performance. The results show that the centrality of a fund's position in a fund network has a significant positive impact on its investment performance. The results have obvious economic significance: we find that an increase of one standard deviation in the degree, closeness, or eigenvector measures of a fund's position in the network increases investment performance by an average of 54.43%, 51.15%, and 50.93% respectively.
We also examine the channels through which network position affects performance. Specially, we examine fund stock selection skills, asset allocation skills, and fund management skills. First, institutional investors located at the center of a network receive rich, accurate, and timely information about stock pricing. This information can promote fund managers' analyses and mastery of stock fundamentals, thereby improving their stock selection skills.
Second, the transmission of information between funds is an important factor that affects managers' asset allocation strategy. Fund managers located at the center of a network have more accurate information and can use their information to allocate assets independently and effectively, that is, they have improved asset allocation skills. Third, social networks can promote the dissemination of information, thereby improving managers' fund management skills.
Finally, we examine the influence of fund networks on fund shares, which we define as a fund's market share. A fund network provides channels for the dissemination and exchange of information. Fund managers at the center of a network receive faster and more valuable information, which allows them to implement high-quality portfolio management and product differentiation strategies. High-quality portfolio management and product differentiation are effective strategies for gaining market share. This study shows that fund networks have a significant positive impact on funds' market share.
This research makes two major contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on the interactions between institutional investors' shareholdings. Most studies have assumed that institutional investors are homogeneous, and there is a lack of research on the heterogeneity of institutional investors and their interactions. We expand this field by constructing a model of a dynamic co-ownership fund network. The fund network allows for the exchange of information between co-ownership funds, reflects the interactions between institutional investors, and distinguishes institutional investors' holdings on the basis of their network location. Using a series of centrality measurement methods, we examine the effects of network location on a fund's ability to obtain information and take actions. Second, we contribute to the research on the impact of social relationships on investment performance by examining the impact of social networks on performance from the perspective of dynamic institutional investor interactions. We build a model of fund networks to illustrate dynamic institutional investor shareholding interaction, and examine its impact on fund investment performance. We find that in a fund network based on co-ownership, positive information diffusion effects dominate, which leads to better investment performance for funds with more relationships. In addition, the social interaction between funds in a network improve the managers' stock selection skills, asset allocation skills, and management skills, which ultimately improve the funds' investment performance.
Keywords:  Institutional Investors    Fund Network    Investment Performance    Information Diffusion Effect
JEL分类号:  D83   D85   G11   G23  
基金资助: *本文为浙江省社科规划课题成果(课题编号:21WZQH08Z)。感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见,文责自负。
作者简介:  陈胜蓝,管理学博士,教授,浙江工业大学经济学院,E-mail:chenshenglan@zjut.edu.cn.
李 璟,博士研究生,内蒙古大学经济管理学院,E-mail:15334742022@163.com.
引用本文:    
陈胜蓝, 李璟. 基金网络能够提高投资绩效吗?[J]. 金融研究, 2021, 492(6): 170-188.
CHEN Shenglan, LI Jing. Can Fund Networks Improve Investment Performance?. Journal of Financial Research, 2021, 492(6): 170-188.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2021/V492/I6/170
[1] 陈新春、刘阳和罗荣华,2017,《机构投资者信息共享会引来黑天鹅吗?——基金信息网络与极端市场风险》,《金融研究》第7期,第140~155页。
[2] 孔东民、刘莎莎、陈小林和邢精平,2015,《个体沟通、交易行为与信息优势:基于共同基金访问的证据》,《经济研究》第11期,第106~119页。
[3] 刘京军和苏楚林,2016,《传染的资金:基于网络结构的基金资金流量及业绩影响研究》,《管理世界》第1期,第54~65页。
[4] 罗荣华、田正磊和方红艳,2020,《“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角》,《金融研究》第8期,第188~206页。
[5] 申宇、赵静梅和何欣,2016,《校友关系网络,基金投资业绩与“小圈子”效应》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期,第403~428页。
[6] Agarwal, V., T. Clifton Green, and H. Ren. 2018. “Alpha or Beta in the Eye of the Beholder: What Drives Hedge Fund Flows?”, Journal of Financial Economics, 127(3): 417~434.
[7] Berk, Jonathan B., and Jules H. van Binsbergen. 2015. “Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry”, Journal of Financial Economics, 118(1): 1~20.
[8] Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch. 1992. “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades”, Journal of Political Economy, 100(5): 992~1026.
[9] Borgatti, Stephen P., and Daniel S. Halgin. 2011. “On Network Theory”, Organization Science, 22(5): 1168~1181.
[10] Bregnard, N., and C. Salva. 2019. “Pension Fund Board Governance and Asset Allocation: Evidence from Switzerland”, Working Paper.
[11] Brinson, Gary P., L. Randolph Hood, and Gilbert L. Beebower. 1986. “Determinants of Portfolio Performanc”, Financial Analysts Journal, (7-8): 40~44.
[12] Bushee, Brian J., and Theodore H. Goodman. 2007. “Which Institutional Investors Trade Based on Private Information about Earnings and Returns?”, Journal of Accounting Research, 45(2): 289~321.
[13] Cohen, L., A. Frazzini, and C. Malloy. 2008. “The Small World of Investing: Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns”, Journal of Political Economy, 116(5): 951~979.
[14] Crane, Alan D., A. Koch, and S. Michenaud. 2019. “Institutional Investor Cliques and Governance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 133(1): 175~197.
[15] Edmans, A., and Clifford G. Holderness. 2017. “Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence”, In The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance(Vol. 1, pp. 541~636). North-Holland.
[16] Giroud, X., and Holger M. Mueller. 2019. “Firms' Internal Networks and Local Economic Shocks”, American Economic Review, 109(10): 3617~49.
[17] Han, B., and L. Yang. 2013. “Social Networks, Information Acquisition, and Asset Prices”, Management Science, 59(6): 1444~1457.
[18] Hochberg, Yael V., A. Ljungqvist, and Y. Lu. 2007. “Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance”, The Journal of Finance, 62(1): 251~301.
[19] Hong, H., Jeffrey D. Kubik, and Jeremy C. Stein. 2005. “Thy Neighbor's Portfolio: Word-of-mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers”, The Journal of Finance, 60(6): 2801~2824.
[20] Khorana, A., and H. Servaes. 2012. “What Drives Market Share in the Mutual Fund Industry?”, Review of Finance, 16(1): 81~113.
[21] Moreno, D., R. Rodriguez, and R. Zambrana. 2018. “Management Sub-advising in the Mutual Fund Industry”, Journal of Financial Economics, 127(3): 567~587.
[22] Ozsoylev, Han N., J. Walden, M. Deniz Yavuz, and R. Bildik. 2014. “Investor Networks in the Stock Market”, The Review of Financial Studies, 27(5): 1323~1366.
[23] Pool, Veronika K., N. Stoffman, and Scott E. Yonker. 2015. “The People in Your Neighborhood: Social Interactions and Mutual Fund Portfolios”, The Journal of Finance, 70(6): 2679~2732.
[24] Rossi, Alberto G., D. Blake, A. Timmermann, I. Tonks, and R. Wermers. 2018. “Network Centrality and Delegated Investment Performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 128(1): 183~206.
[25] Shiller, Robert J., and J. Pound. 1989. “Survey Evidence on Diffusion of Interest and Information among Investors”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 12(1): 47~66.
[26] Stein, Jeremy C. 2008. “Conversations among Competitors”, American Economic Review, 98(5): 2150~62.
[27] Zhu, A. 2016. “Social Connections and Information Production: Evidence from Mutual Fund Portfolios and Performance”, Working Paper.
[1] 罗荣华, 田正磊, 方红艳. “和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 482(8): 188-206.
[2] 邵新建, 王兴春, 贾中正, 廖静池. 投资银行-机构投资者关系、“捧场”与IPO中的利益问题[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 473(11): 170-188.
[3] 郭白滢, 周任远. 信息互动、投资决策与股票价格——基于机构投资者信息网络的分析[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 472(10): 188-206.
[4] 代昀昊. 机构投资者、所有权性质与权益资本成本[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 459(9): 143-159.
[5] 陈新春, 刘阳, 罗荣华. 机构投资者信息共享会引来黑天鹅吗? ——基金信息网络与极端市场风险[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 445(7): 140-155.
[6] 高昊宇, 杨晓光, 叶彦艺. 机构投资者对暴涨暴跌的抑制作用:基于中国市场的实证[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 440(2): 163-178.
[7] 邓路, 刘瑞琪, 江萍. 公司超额银行借款会导致过度投资吗?[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 448(10): 115-129.
[8] 罗进辉, 向元高, 金思静. 中国资本市场低价股的溢价之谜[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 439(1): 191-206.
[9] 黎文靖, 路晓燕. 机构投资者关注企业的环境绩效吗?——来自我国重污染行业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2015, 426(12): 97-112.
[1] 王曦, 朱立挺, 王凯立. 我国货币政策是否关注资产价格?——基于马尔科夫区制转换BEKK多元GARCH模型[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 1 -17 .
[2] 刘勇政, 李岩. 中国的高速铁路建设与城市经济增长[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 18 -33 .
[3] 况伟大, 王琪琳. 房价波动、房贷规模与银行资本充足率[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 34 -48 .
[4] 祝树金, 赵玉龙. 资源错配与企业的出口行为——基于中国工业企业数据的经验研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 49 -64 .
[5] 陈德球, 陈运森, 董志勇. 政策不确定性、市场竞争与资本配置[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 65 -80 .
[6] 牟敦果, 王沛英. 中国能源价格内生性研究及货币政策选择分析[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 81 -95 .
[7] 高铭, 江嘉骏, 陈佳, 刘玉珍. 谁说女子不如儿郎?——P2P投资行为与过度自信[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 96 -111 .
[8] 吕若思, 刘青, 黄灿, 胡海燕, 卢进勇. 外资在华并购是否改善目标企业经营绩效?——基于企业层面的实证研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 112 -127 .
[9] 姜军, 申丹琳, 江轩宇, 伊志宏. 债权人保护与企业创新[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 128 -142 .
[10] 刘莎莎, 孔高文. 信息搜寻、个人投资者交易与股价联动异象——基于股票送转的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 143 -157 .
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed   
版权所有 © 《金融研究》编辑部
本系统由北京玛格泰克科技发展有限公司设计开发 技术支持:support@magtech.com.cn
京ICP备11029882号-1