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金融研究  2019, Vol. 474 Issue (12): 18-37    
  “货币政策与宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架”专辑 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
“双支柱”调控框架的理论与经验基础
马勇
中国人民大学财政金融学院/中国财政金融政策研究中心,北京 100872
Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of the Two-Pillar Framework
MA Yong
School of Finance/China Financial Policy Research Center, Renmin University of China
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摘要 本文从基本事实、基本理论和基本实践等“底层逻辑”出发,系统阐述了“双支柱”调控的现实必要性、理论合理性和实践可行性,并在此基础上明确了中国实施“双支柱”调控框架的现实基础、实践经验和未来完善方向。本文的研究结果表明,随着金融和宏观经济之间关系的日益深化和复杂化,金融稳定对宏观经济的稳定具有重要影响,但传统旨在维护价格稳定的货币政策无法同时有效实现金融稳定,根据“丁伯根法则”和政策比较优势原理,在货币政策的基础上纳入宏观审慎政策,形成“双支柱”调控框架,分别致力于价格稳定和金融稳定的目标,既符合客观现实的调控需要,也具有理论和实践上的合理性和可行性。从目前全球范围内主要国家的“双支柱”调控实践来看,要进一步形成稳定可靠的政策规则和成熟的操作框架,未来还需重点解决“政策目标、政策工具、政策协调”三个核心问题。本文对这些问题的可能解决路径提供了一些初步的思路和建议。
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马勇
关键词:  “双支柱”调控框架  货币政策  宏观审慎政策  政策协调    
Summary:  As a collective reflection on and policy response to the 2008 international financial crisis, policy makers around the world have formally adopted macro-prudential policy with the objective of developing a new type of policy tool that complements traditional monetary policy while directly reducing financial risks and promoting financial stability. The introduction of macro-prudential policy to central banks' policy frameworks as a new tool for macro financial adjustment has gradually shifted the traditional “one-pillar” adjustment framework based solely on monetary policy to a “two-pillar” adjustment framework underpinned by both monetary and macro-prudential policies.
   Based on the essential logic of basic facts, basic theories, and basic practices, this study comprehensively explains the necessity, theoretical rationale, and practical feasibility of the two-pillar adjustment from three major perspectives, and further clarifies its actual foundation, practical implementation, and future improvements in China. The findings show that the two-pillar adjustment framework has both real world and theoretical foundations. First, financial stability has a notable impact on macroeconomic stability, but traditional monetary policies are unable to effectively achieve financial stability. According to “Dingbergen's Law” and the principle of policy comparative advantage, it is necessary to construct a new “policy pillar” (i.e., macro-prudential policy) to achieve the objective of financial stability. Second, given the deep integration and mutual influence between financial policy and the real economy, the traditional monetary policy pillar and the new macro-prudential policy pillar should be thoroughly coordinated and combined within a unified framework to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of policy implementation and to avoid policy conflicts and frictions. In addition, because the dynamics of the real economic and financial cycles are complex, the policy tools under the two-pillar adjustment framework (including both the monetary policy tools and the macro-prudential policy tools) should be adequate and complete enough to improve the accuracy, pertinence, and flexibility of policy implementation.
   Drawing on the current two-pillar adjustment practices in major countries around the world, we focus on the three core issues of policy objective, policy tools, and policy coordination and consider how to form stable and reliable policy rules and a mature operational framework. First, to address the policy objective issue, we ask the following question: if the final goal of macro-prudential policy is financial stability, what specific target objectives should be used? Without clear targets, the randomness of policy operations will increase, leading to instability in policy making and practices, resulting in less effective policy implementation. A literature review suggests that monitoring and judging activities could be improved by the construction of structural indices, as financial stability is affected by both aggregate and structural imbalances. Second, previous studies have shown that different macro-prudential policy tools influence financial stability through different paths and transmission mechanisms. Furthermore, under different structural imbalances, different tools have comparative advantages, so policy makers should consider constructing an “objective oriented” policy tool guide that reflects accumulated experience and further strengthens the pertinence, reliability, and effectiveness of the policy tools chosen for specific objectives and conditions. Third, one of the core aims in perfecting the two-pillar adjustment framework is to improve the coordination between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy. The rules and institutions must effectively deal with deviations and conflicts between the two basic goals of price (economic) stability and financial stability. They can also use the flexible configuration of multi tools to address long-term and global goals, thus improving the pertinence, flexibility, and effectiveness of policy implementation.
   Finally, in the long run, the “two-pillar” adjustment framework should maintain a certain degree of openness and compatibility during the process of development, so that it can gradually achieve more unified and system-based coordination with a broad range of economic and financial policies.
Keywords:  Two-pillar Adjustment    Monetary Policy    Macro-prudential Policy    Policy Coordination
JEL分类号:  E32   E44   F36  
基金资助: * 本文感谢北京市社会科学基金重点项目“‘双支柱’调控框架的理论与实证研究”(18LJA001)资助。
作者简介:  马勇,经济学博士,教授,中国人民大学财政金融学院,中国财政金融政策研究中心,国际货币研究所,E-mail:mayongmail@ruc.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
马勇. “双支柱”调控框架的理论与经验基础[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 474(12): 18-37.
MA Yong. Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of the Two-Pillar Framework. Journal of Financial Research, 2019, 474(12): 18-37.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2019/V474/I12/18
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