Summary:
The international financial crisis in 2008 had a profound impact on global economic and financial systems and also posed a major challenge to financial supervision and macro policy frameworks. This launched wide-ranging theoretical and practical discussions and reflections, which concluded that the complex relationships between financial institutions, high leverage and shadow banking problems, underestimation of liquidity risk, financial procyclicality, and the lack of effective mechanisms to deal with systemically important institutions are all important reasons for the failure of regulatory authorities to effectively identify and resolve systemic risks. Traditional micro supervision and monetary policy cannot guarantee the overall stability of the financial system; it is necessary to develop macro-prudential policies to deal with system risks. After the 2008 crisis, this recognition promoted the reform of macro policy and financial supervision systems. Macro-prudential policy is rapidly developing. Not only are the policy objectives clearer and the types of tools more standardized, but there has also been constant improvement in the relevant theoretical frameworks. As a new policy framework formed after the 2008 crisis, the effectiveness of macro-prudential tools, mechanisms, and policy frameworks needs further study, as does the relationship between macro-prudential policy and monetary policy. In particular, it is necessary to study how to apply the new theories to the design of macro-prudential system frameworks in different economic and institutional environments. Important practical tasks are to strengthen the coordination between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy and enhance the policy effect of the “two pillars.” How can we draw on successful international experience and practice, and establish a suitable macro-prudential policy framework？ These questions have become the focus of theoretical research and policy practice. In the Chinese setting, systematic risk identification, monitoring, and analysis are complex and difficult tasks, and more detailed and in-depth studies of macro-prudential policies are required. Within the institutional framework, the relationship between macro-prudential policy and monetary policy, and how to reasonably design a policy-making framework, have become the key issues. First, we systematically review the theoretical basis, policy objectives, and tools of macro-prudential policy. Second, we analyze the relationship between macro-prudential policy and monetary policy with reference to three important aspects of the relationship between the two types of policies. Third, we systematically examine the Bank of England in terms of organizational structure design, monetary policy framework reform, and financial policy framework design. Focusing on the reform of its monetary policy and macro-prudential policy framework, we examine how the Bank of England could better integrate theoretical development and institutional design. Finally, the study offers some policy suggestions for the development of macro-prudential policy in China. This study has a number of policy implications. (1) Policy makers should clarify the independent decision-making modes of macro-prudential policy and monetary policy. On this basis, we can establish strategies, objectives, tools, and operating rules for macro-prudential policy and a comprehensive and systematic financial risk analysis system that will have the advantages of a central bank in terms of macro-economic analysis and policy making. (2) Policy makers should integrate and standardize the existing macro-prudential policy tools and add counter cyclical capital requirements and counter cyclical leverage constraints into the macro-prudential policy toolbox as soon as possible. (3) Policy makers should further promote the integration of financial statistical data, establish a set of core indicators of systematic risk at different levels, strengthen the unified monitoring of systematic risk, and form an intermediate goal for macro-prudential policy development. (4) Methodologically, policy makers should speed up the establishment of China's systematic risk model, correctly evaluate the role of stress testing in macro-prudential policy-making, and coordinate the implementation of stress testing. (5) A standardized mechanism for communication and information release should be established to actively guide market expectations. (6) It is important to strengthen the integration of institutions and departments in the “before, during and after” phases of systematic risk response, and promote the coordination of monetary policy and macro-prudential policy. At the same time, we should promote the use of technology for the mutual verification and complementarity of our macroeconomic and system risk models.
王信, 贾彦东. 货币政策和宏观审慎政策的关联及启示——基于英格兰银行的经验[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 474(12): 38-57.
WANG Xin, JIA Yandong. The Relationship between Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy: The Experience of The Bank of England. Journal of Financial Research, 2019, 474(12): 38-57.
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