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金融研究  2019, Vol. 474 Issue (12): 1-17    
  “货币政策与宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架”专辑 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
对货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架内在逻辑的思考
李斌, 吴恒宇
金融委办公室秘书局, 北京 100800;
中国人民银行重庆营业管理部, 重庆 401147
On the Intrinsic Logic of the Two-Pillar Macro-management Framework of Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy
LI Bin, WU Hengyu
Secretary Bureau of Office, Financial Stability and Development Committe;
Chongqing Operation Office, The People's Bank of China
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摘要 本轮国际金融危机以来,金融稳定在中央银行政策目标中的重要性再次得到强化。随着具有顺周期波动特征的金融市场和金融资产规模显著增大,金融管理政策需要更加关注金融稳定和系统性风险问题,货币稳定和金融稳定“双目标”的重要性凸显出来。政策目标的变化相应要求优化和完善政策工具箱,需要健全宏观审慎政策框架作为应对系统性风险的工具,并与货币政策相互配合,形成由货币政策和宏观审慎政策“双支柱”支撑起“双目标”的基本框架,共同维护好货币稳定和金融稳定。在此框架中,货币政策和宏观审慎政策都不可或缺,须相互补充,形成合力,产生“一加一大于二”的政策效应增进效果。健全货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架,有利于把经济周期和金融周期更好地结合起来,把维护经济稳定与促进金融稳定更好地结合起来。下一阶段应进一步健全宏观审慎政策框架,并完善货币政策和宏观审慎政策协调配合的体制机制。
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李斌
吴恒宇
关键词:  货币政策  宏观审慎政策  双支柱调控框架    
Summary:  This study attempts to sort out some important changes in the philosophy of global financial management that emerged after the international financial crisis. It focuses on the theoretical basis and intrinsic logic of the two-pillar macro-management framework that combines monetary policy with macroprudential policy.
   In the aftermath of the 2008 international financial crisis, the importance of financial stability in the central bank's policy framework has once again been recognized, and together with a currency stability target, it has become part of the central bank's “double-target” policy portfolio. The policy objectives of the central bank have gone through a process of negation and spiraling.
   Changes in policy objectives require the optimization and improvement of the policy toolbox. In this case, there are multiple options. One is to strengthen the original monetary policy's function and incorporate financial stability responsibilities into the traditional monetary policy framework, for example by focusing on overall price stability in a broader sense including asset prices. However, in the current situation, there are obvious shortcomings to relying solely on monetary policy to maintain financial stability and prevent systemic risks. Based on the consensus of a range of economists after the crisis, to manage and prevent systemic risks and maintain financial stability, it is necessary to strengthen the macroprudential policy framework.
   Monetary policy and macroprudential policy have different focuses; however, they do not operate separately, but are interactive. When they are coordinated, they can form a synergy; this is the basis of the “two-pillar” framework. China has proposed and is now improving a two-pillar macro-management framework that combines monetary policy and macroprudential policy; this is an important achievement that reflects the lessons of the international financial crisis. The two-pillar framework is an important theoretical and practical innovation that addresses China's national conditions. In our opinion, the two-pillar framework is an indication that monetary policy and macroprudential policy are both indispensable for fulfilling the target portfolio of currency and financial stability. Monetary policy cannot replace macroprudential policy, and vice versa. They are like the two pillars supporting a bridge: although their respective positions and forces are different, they are both indispensable. Moreover, the two pillars may be equally important. It is also possible that one of them will be more important for a certain period, while the other will play a supporting role. As the situation and the focus of policy objectives change, the relative importance of the pillars may vary. However, both pillars are essential, and the fundamental policy framework of two pillars supporting double targets should remain constant. Many studies have discussed the theoretical foundations of a two-pillar framework or studied the coordination of monetary policy and macroprudential policy. In practice, although some central banks have not explicitly proposed a two-pillar concept, their policy frameworks have essentially adopted the basic characteristics of the two-pillar framework: combining monetary policy and macroprudential policy.
   The People's Bank of China has persistently focused on the coordination of monetary policy and macroprudential policy. For example, when there are large-scale international twin surpluses, the liquidity of the banking system is raised above the appropriate level, and window guidance and other policy tools with macroprudential attributes are used to curb excessive growth in credit while promoting the stability of banks. In the transitional stage of the monetary policy framework, it is difficult to fully control credit expansion using only interest rates, as they are subject to various factors and there are many interest rate insensitive entities. In such cases, it is necessary to apply macroprudential policy measures. Generally, the effective coordination of monetary policy and macroprudential policy has enabled China to better cope with challenging internal and external situations and to create a moderate monetary and financial environment for economic restructuring and reform, while preventing systemic risk and promoting the sustainable development of the Chinese economy. In the next stage, the two-pillar macro-management framework can be strengthened by further improving the macroprudential policy framework and coordination mechanisms.
Keywords:  Monetary Policy    Macroprudential Policy    Two-pillar Macro-management Framework
JEL分类号:  E22   E58   O11  
作者简介:  李斌,经济学博士,研究员,金融委办公室秘书局,E-mail:bli@pbc.gov.cn.吴恒宇,管理学博士,经济师,中国人民银行重庆营业管理部,E-mail:whydx@163.com.
引用本文:    
李斌, 吴恒宇. 对货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架内在逻辑的思考[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 474(12): 1-17.
LI Bin, WU Hengyu. On the Intrinsic Logic of the Two-Pillar Macro-management Framework of Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy. Journal of Financial Research, 2019, 474(12): 1-17.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2019/V474/I12/1
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