Abstract:
China's shadow banking sector develops rapidly and the structures are becoming more and more sophisticated, which enhance the liquidity and systemic risks and dampen macro policy effectiveness. From monetary supply and demand sides respectively, we do empirical analysis on the relationship between banking off-balance sheet wealth management (OWM) and monetary policy. The regressions based on the theory of financial disintermediation shows that the OWM really enlarge the money multiplier, which makes central bank's control of broad money even more difficult and decreasing the effectiveness of quantity monetary policy. The expansion of shadow banking, esp. the increasing OWM outsourcing and leverage through non-banking sectors, exaggerates the liquidity demand and enlarges the margin of deposit and non-deposit institutions. The empirical studies also show that OWM expansion is closely related with the deposit and loan rates, esp. the lowered deposit rates. From now on, for one hand, we should enhance financial supervision and macro-prudential policy to offset the defects of the quantity based monetary policy, and for the other hand, it is urgent to pay more attention to the price target instead of quantity indicators, liberalize the dual tracks of interest rates, improved the monetary tools and turn the quantity based monetary policy to priced based policy mode.
纪敏, 李宏瑾. 影子银行、资管业务与货币调控方式转型——基于银行表外理财数据的实证分析[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 462(12): 1-18.
JI Min, LI Hongjin. Shadow Banking, Asset Management and Monetary Policy Transformation:Empirical Study Based on the Data of OWM. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 462(12): 1-18.
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