Abstract:
China's public health insurance has reached universal coverage. Current challenge is to keep the sustainability of health insurance system. According to the arrangement, informal employees can voluntarily participate in the Urban Employee Based Medical Insurance (UEBMI), which may raise the adverse selection issue. We take advantage of the institutional features of Chinese system, using the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 2012-2014 data, to distinguish adverse selection from moral hazard empirically and find that people who voluntarily participate in UEBMI have higher medical expenditure. The results show that people who voluntarily participate in UEBMI have about 78% more medical expenditure than those who compulsorily participate in UEBMI. Moreover, people who voluntarily participate in UEBMI have about 45% more medical expenses than those who participate in Residents Medical Insurance. The selectable medical insurance will improve the welfare of informal employees. However, it is necessary to reform the health insurance system to avoid the potential risk of deficit of health insurance system.
封进, 王贞, 宋弘. 中国医疗保险体系中的自选择与医疗费用——基于灵活就业人员参保行为的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 458(8): 85-101.
FENG Jin, WANG Zhen, SONG Hong. Self-selection and Medical Expenditure in Chinese Health Insurance System: Evidence from Informal Employees' Participation. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 458(8): 85-101.
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