Abstract:
Recently, the mass phenomenon of executive compensation in listed companies has drawn investors' and news media's intensive attention. Using a data set of 11,567 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2011, this study examines the impact of media coverage on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts, and further explores potential differences of this impact in firms with different nature of property rights and located in regions with different institutional environment. The results show that (1) there is a positive and significant relationship between media coverage and executive pay-performance sensitivity, indicating that media coverage may increase the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts; (2) after differentiating firms' nature of property rights, the preceding positive effect of media coverage is found to only exist in state-owned enterprises, suggesting that media coverage could mainly increase the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts in state-owned enterprises; (3) high levels of institutional environment development significantly enhance the preceding positive effect of media coverage, implying that institutional environment is an important condition for media coverage performing the preceding effect.
罗进辉. 媒体报道与高管薪酬契约有效性[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 453(3): 190-206.
LUO Jinhui. Media Coverage and the Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Contracts. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 453(3): 190-206.
[1]陈运森和谢德仁,2012,《董事网络、独立董事治理与高管激励》,《金融研究》第2期,第168～182页。 [2]戴亦一、潘越和刘思超, 2011,《媒体监督、政府干预与公司治理:来自中国上市公司财务重述视角的证据》,《世界经济》第11期,第121～144页。 [3]樊纲、王小鲁和朱恒鹏,2011,《中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告》,北京:经济科学出版社。 [4]方军雄,2012,《高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策》,《管理世界》第11期,第144～155页。 [5]孔东民、刘莎莎和应千伟,2013,《公司行为中的媒体角色:激浊扬清还是推波助澜？》,《管理世界》第7期,第145～162页。 [6]李培功和沈艺峰,2010,《媒体的公司治理作用:中国的经验证据》,《经济研究》第4期,第14～27页。 [7]李培功和沈艺峰,2013,《经理薪酬、轰动报道与媒体的公司治理作用》,《管理科学学报》第10期,第63～80页。 [8]梁上坤,2017,《媒体关注、信息环境与公司费用粘性》,《中国工业经济》第2期,第154～173页。 [9]刘启亮、李祎和张建平,2013,《媒体负面报道、诉讼风险与审计契约稳定性——基于外部治理视角的研究》,《管理世界》第11期,第144～154页。 [10]罗进辉,2012,《媒体报道的公司治理作用——双重代理成本视角》,《金融研究》第10期,第153～166页。 [11]罗进辉,2014,《独立董事的明星效应——基于高管薪酬-业绩敏感性的考察》,《南开管理评论》第3期,第62～73页。 [12]罗进辉和杜兴强,2014,《媒体报道、制度环境与股价崩盘风险》,《会计研究》第9期,第53～59页。 [13]马连福、王元芳和沈小秀,2013,《国有企业党组织治理、冗余雇员与高管薪酬契约》,《管理世界》第5期,第100～115页。 [14]权小锋、吴世农和文芳,2010,《管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵》,《经济研究》第11期,第73～87页。 [15]饶育蕾、彭叠峰和成大超, 2010,《媒体注意力会引起股票的异常收益吗？——来自中国股票市场的经验证据》,《系统工程理论与实践》第2期,第287～297页。 [16]魏刚,2000,《高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效》,《经济研究》第3期,第32～39页。 [17]谢德仁、林乐和陈运森,2012,《薪酬委员会独立性与更高的经理人报酬-业绩敏感度——基于薪酬辩护假说的分析和检验》,《管理世界》第1期,第121～140页。 [18]熊艳、李常青和魏志华,2011,《媒体“轰动效应”:传导机制、经济后果与声誉惩戒——基于“霸王事件”的案例研究》,《管理世界》第10期,第125～140页。 [19]杨德明和赵璨,2012,《媒体监督、媒体治理与高管薪酬》,《经济研究》第6期,第116～126页。 [20]游家兴和吴静,2012,《沉默的中螺旋:媒体情绪与资产误定价》,《经济研究》第7期,第141～152页。 [21]于忠泊、田高良、齐保垒和张皓,2011,《媒体关注的公司治理机制——基于盈余管理视角的考察》,《管理世界》第9期,第127～140页。 [22]于忠泊、田高良和张咏梅,2012,《媒体关注、制度环境与盈余信息市场反应——对市场压力假设的再检验》,《会计研究》第9期,第40～51页。 [23]翟胜宝、徐亚琴和杨德明,2015,《媒体能监督国有企业高管在职消费么？》,《会计研究》第5期,第57～63页。 [24]赵龙凯、陆子昱和王致远,2013,《众里寻“股”千百度——股票收益率与百度搜索量关系的实证研究》,《金融研究》第4期,第183～195页。 [25]周开国、应千伟和钟畅,2016,《媒体监督能够起到外部治理的作用吗？——来自中国上市公司违规的证据》,《金融研究》第6期,第193～206页。 [26]Bai, C., J. Lu, and Z. Tao. 2006. “The Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform: Empirical Evidence from China”, American Economic Review, 96(2): 353～357. [27]Bebchuk, L. A., and J. M. Fried. 2003. “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(3): 71～92. [28]Bebchuk, L. A., J. M. Fried, and D. I. Walker. 2002. “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation”, University of Chicago Law Review, 69: 751～846. [29]Besley, T., and A. Prat. 2006. “Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand？ Media Capture and Government Accountability”, American Economic Review, 96(3): 720～736. [30]Chen, G., M. Firth, and L. Xu. 2009. “Does the Type of Ownership Control Matter？ Evidence from China's Listed Companies”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(1): 171～181. [31]Dyck, A., and L. Zingales. 2002. “The Corporate Governance Role of the Media”, NBER Working Paper No. 9309. [32]Dyck, A., and L. Zingales. 2004. “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison”, Journal of Finance, 59(2): 537～600. [33]Dyck, A., N. Volchkova, and L. Zingales. 2008. “The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia”, Journal of Finance, 58(3): 1093～1135. [34]Fang, L., and J. Peress. 2009. “Media Coverage and the Cross-section of Stock Returns”, Journal of Finance, 59(5): 2023～2052. [35]Firth, M., T. Y. Leung, and O. M. Rui. 2010. “Justifying Top Management Pay in a Transitional Economy”, Journal of Empirical Finance, 17(5): 852～866. [36]Gurun, U. G., and A. Bulter. 2012. “Don't Believe the Hype: Local Media Slant, Local Advertising, and Firm Value”, Journal of Finance, 67(2): 561～598. [37]Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305～360. [38]Joe, J. R. 2003. “Why Press Coverage of a Client Influences the Audit Opinion”, Journal of Accounting Research, 41(1): 109～133. [39]Joe, J. R., H. Louis, and D. Robinson. 2009. “Managers' and Investors' Responses to Media Exposure of Board Ineffectiveness”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(3): 579～605. [40]Miller, G. S. 2006. “The Press as a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud”, Journal of Accounting Research, 44(5): 1001～1033. [41]Petersen, M. A. 2009. “Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches”, Review of Financial Studies, 22(1): 435～480. [42]You, J., B. Zhang, and L. Zhang. 2018. “Who Captures the Power of the Pen？”, Review of Financial Studies, 31(1): 43～96.
