International Regulatory Reforms for Securities Financing Transactions and Implications for China
LI Wenhong, JIA Junyi
Innovative Business Supervision and Cooperation Department, China Banking Regulatory Commission; Peking University /China Banking Regulatory Commission
Abstract:
As reflected by the recent global financial crisis, shadow banking has become an important source of systemic risks due to its lack of regulation, transparency, as well as capital and liquidity buffers. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Financial Stability Board, working together with other international standard setting organizations such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, formulated the policy framework to strengthen oversight and regulation of shadow banking. As an integral part of this framework, policy recommendations to address liquidity mismatch, leverage, contagion risks and pro-cyclicality in securities financing transactions (SFTs) have been introduced to enhance global financial stability. In China, a series of regulations and rules for the SFTs have been implemented. However, several cases including that of the Sealand Securities Company in 2016 revealed various problems in the SFTs framework, such as liquidity mismatch, leverage, non-compliance and weaknesses in the SFTs regulation. This paper analyzes the international SFTs regulatory framework developed after the financial crisis and proposes recommendations on how to improve the SFTs regulation and supervision in China.
李文红, 贾君怡. 证券融资交易国际监管改革进展及对我国的启示与借鉴[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 452(2): 45-60.
LI Wenhong, JIA Junyi. International Regulatory Reforms for Securities Financing Transactions and Implications for China. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 452(2): 45-60.
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