Abstract:
In the context of the latest reform about state-owned enterprises (SOEs), focusing on the “Compensation reform program of central SOEs managers” in 2014, this paper constructs a principal–agent model under asymmetric information and examines the impact of ex ante pay limit on competitive and monopolistic central SOEs. Empirical results show that: 1) The pay limit indeed reduces managers' monetary compensation and the gap between management and other employees in central SOEs; 2) Competitive central SOEs have significant negative cumulative abnormal returns which is consistent with the intervening hypothesis, while monopolistic central SOEs are not affected according to the neutral hypothesis; 3) In terms of mechanisms, when corporate governance is weaker, industry grows faster and is more competitive, or the degree of marketization in the region is higher, pay limit leads to greater loss in firm value, but these effects only exist in competitive central SOEs. Considering the different effects on competitive and monopoly central SOEs, this paper suggests that executive compensation regulation in SOEs should follow the classification and precise supervision rules.
杨青, 王亚男, 唐跃军. “限薪令”的政策效果:基于竞争与垄断性央企市场反应的评估[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 451(1): 156-173.
YANG Qing, WANG Yanan, TANG Yuejun. The Effect of Executive Compensation Regulation:A Study Based on Market Reactions of Competitive and Monopolistic SOEs. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 451(1): 156-173.
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