Abstract:
Within the framework of Chinese decentralization style, the local governments have been given a strong motivation for policy competition in the key tax sources and GDP. And the exogenous administrative restructuring, which is known as “Annexation of suburban counties by cities” Reform, can be used to identify the variation of governmental favoritism, because it decreased the policies for supporting the firms. Applying panels of firms data from the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database for the period 1999 to 2009 with the natural experiment, this paper outlines the extent to which local governments favoritism influenced firms’ export performance. We find that: compared to other firms located in the control group, the export performance become worse after the governmental favoritism is reduced. The causal mechanism is firms suffer from a worse-off export performance for the reduced governmental favoritism as a result of getting the worse polices, such as less subsidies and more taxation.
卢盛峰, 陈思霞. 政策偏袒的经济收益:来自中国工业企业出口的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 433(7): 33-47.
LU Shengfeng, CHEN Sixia. The Value of Governmental Favoritism: Evidence from Export Performance ofChinese Industrial Enterprises. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 433(7): 33-47.
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