Please wait a minute...
金融研究  2016, Vol. 437 Issue (11): 191-206    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
交叉上市、增长机会与股利政策——基于政府干预假说的检验
覃家琦, 邵新建, 肖立晟
南开大学商学院, 天津 300071;
对外经济贸易大学国际经贸学院,北京 100029;
中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所,北京 100732
Cross-listings, Growth Opportunities and Dividend Policy:A Test Based on Government Intervention Hypothesis
QIN Jiaqi, SHAO Xinjian, XIAO Lisheng
School of Business, Nankai University;
School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics;
Institute of World Economics and Politics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
下载:  PDF (1418KB) 
输出:  BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)      
摘要 尽管交叉上市领域中主流的绑定假说获得了大量检验,但该假说是否适用于非美国国家或地区尚需进一步考察,其在解释交叉上市与公司股利政策的关系上尚存在逻辑上的不一致。本文基于中国H+A交叉上市的历史背景以及政府干预假说,推断H+A交叉上市公司由于更多的政府干预而具有更低的增长机会、更低的现金股利支付水平与支付意愿。基于2007-2014年期间的5602个非平衡面板数据,研究结果完全支持本文假设。在采用干预效应模型、双元Probit模型、倾向得分匹配与偏差修正匹配等方法控制了样本选择偏差与内生性之后,研究假设仍然得到良好的支持。进一步研究发现,H+A公司具有更大的过度投资概率、更低的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性和更低的高管变更-业绩敏感性,这加强了本文的政府干预假说。
服务
把本文推荐给朋友
加入引用管理器
E-mail Alert
RSS
作者相关文章
覃家琦
邵新建
肖立晟
关键词:  交叉上市  增长机会  股利政策  政府干预    
Abstract:  Although bonding hypothesis which is prevailing in the research area of cross-listings has received a great many tests, it is necessary to further investigate whether it is applied to the cases of non-US countries or areas. Based on the historical context of Chinese H+A cross-listings and hypothesis of government intervention, we confer that H+A companies have lower growth opportunities, less dividend pay-out ratio, and lower willingness of dividend payment, due to greater intervention from government. With 5602 observations of unbalanced panel data from 2007 to 2014, the empirical results support our hypothesis completely. Even after controlling the problem of sample selection bias and endogeneity with the methods of treatment effect model, bivariate probit model, propensity score matching, and bias-corrected matching, our results remain robust. Further investigation also shows that H+A companies have greater likelihood to over-invest, lower sensitivity between compensation of top 3 board directors and firm performance, and lower sensitivity between CEO turnover and performance, which strengthens the government intervention hypothesis that serves as the foundation of this paper.
Key words:  Cross-listing    Growth Opportunities    Dividend Policy    Government Intervention
JEL分类号:  G32   G35   G38  
基金资助: *本文感谢国家自然科学基金项目(70902048、71102075、71232005、71372096、71472039)、对外经济贸易大学学科建设专项经费(XK2016102)、优秀青年学者培育计划(2014YQ01)、中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(CXTD5-01)资助。感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见。文责自负。
通讯作者:  邵新建,通讯作者,经济学博士,副教授,对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,Email:shaoxinjian2010@126.com.   
作者简介:  覃家琦,管理学博士,副教授,南开大学商学院,Email:qjq@nankai.edu.cn.肖立晟,经济学博士,副研究员,中国社科院世界经济与政治研究所,Email:nkxls@126.com.
引用本文:    
覃家琦, 邵新建, 肖立晟. 交叉上市、增长机会与股利政策——基于政府干预假说的检验[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 437(11): 191-206.
QIN Jiaqi, SHAO Xinjian, XIAO Lisheng. Cross-listings, Growth Opportunities and Dividend Policy:A Test Based on Government Intervention Hypothesis. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 437(11): 191-206.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2016/V437/I11/191
[1] 程子健和张俊瑞,2015,《交叉上市、股权性质与企业现金股利政策——基于倾向得分匹配法(PSM)的分析》,《会计研究》第7期,第34~41页。
[2] 孔宁宁和闫希,2009,《交叉上市与公司成长——来自中国“H+A”股的经验证据》,《金融研究》第7期,第134~145页。
[3] 潘红波、夏新平和余明桂,2008,《政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购》,《经济研究》第4期,第41~52页。
[4] 潘越,2007,《中国公司双重上市行为研究》,北京:北京大学出版社。
[5] 覃家琦和邵新建,2015,《交叉上市、政府干预与资本配置效率》,《经济研究》第6期,第117~130页。
[6] 覃家琦和邵新建,2016,《中国交叉上市公司的投资效率与公司价值——绑定假说还是政府干预假说?》,《经济学(季刊)》第3期,第1137~1176页。
[7] 覃家琦、邵新建和赵映雪,2012,《双重上市、IPO抑价与大规模融资行为——来自中国IPO的证据》,《金融研究》第3期,第193~206页。
[8] 肖珉和沈艺峰,2008,《跨地上市公司具有较低的权益资本成本吗?——基于“法与金融”的视角》,《金融研究》第10期,第93~103页。
[9] Biddle, G. C., G. Hilary, and R. S. Verdi. 2009. “How Does Financial Reporting Quality Relate to Investment Efficiency?” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(2-3): 112~131.
[10] Chen, S., Z. Sun, S. Tang, and D. Wu. 2011. “Government Intervention and Investment Efficiency: Evidence from China”. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17: 259~271.
[11] Coffee, J. 1999. “The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications”. Northwestern University Law Review, 93: 641~707.
[12] Coffee, J. 2002. “Racing Towards the Top? The Impact of Cross-listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance”. Columbia Law Review, 102(7): 1757~1832.
[13] Doidge, C., G. A. Karolyi, and R. M. Stulz. 2004. “Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?” Journal of Financial Economics, 71: 205~238.
[14] Ke, Bin, O. Rui, and W. Yu. 2012. “Hong Kong Stock Listing and the Sensitivity of Managerial Compensation to Firm Performance in State-controlled Chinese Firms”. Review of Accounting Studies, 17(1): 166~188.
[15] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1997. “Legal Determinants of External Finance”. Journal of Finance, 52(3): 1131~1150.
[16] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1998. “Law and Finance”. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6): 1113~1155.
[17] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 2000. “Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World”. Journal of Finance, 55(1): 1~33.
[18] Lel, U., and D. P. Miller. 2008. “International Cross-Listing, Firm Performance, and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis”. Journal of Finance, 63(4): 1897~1937.
[19] Rhodes-Kropf, M., D.T. Robinson, and S. Viswanathan. 2005. “Valuation Waves and Merge Activity: The Empirical Evidence”. Journal of Financial Economics, 77: 561~603.
[20] Richardson, S. 2006. “Over-investment of Free Cash Flow”. Review of Accounting Studies, 11:159~189.
[21] Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1994. “Politicians and Firms”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 995~1025.
[22] Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1998. “The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their Cures.” Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
[23] Smith, C. W., and R. L. Watts. 1992. “The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing Dividend, and Compensation Policies”. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(3): 263~292.
[24] Stultz, R. 2005. “The Limits of Financial Globalization”. Journal of Finance, 60(4): 1595~1638.
[25] Stulz, R. 1999. “Globalization, Corporate Finance and Cost of Capital”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 12: 8~25.
[1] 屈依娜, 陈汉文. 现金股利政策、内部控制与市场反应[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 455(5): 191-206.
[2] 吴超鹏, 张媛. 风险投资对上市公司股利政策影响的实证研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 447(9): 178-191.
[3] 黎文靖, 李茫茫. “实体+金融”:融资约束、政策迎合还是市场竞争?——基于不同产权性质视角的经验研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 446(8): 100-116.
[4] 姚耀军, 施丹燕. 互联网金融区域差异化发展的逻辑与检验——路径依赖与政府干预视角[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 443(5): 127-142.
[5] 陈德球, 陈运森, 董志勇. 政策不确定性、市场竞争与资本配置[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 65-80.
[6] 刘行. 政府干预的新度量——基于最终控制人投资组合的视角[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 435(9): 145-160.
[7] 黄 薇, 张海洋, 李 海. 财政专户存款、地方金融机构贷款行为及其经营效率[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 436(10): 79-94.
[1] 王曦, 朱立挺, 王凯立. 我国货币政策是否关注资产价格?——基于马尔科夫区制转换BEKK多元GARCH模型[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 1 -17 .
[2] 刘勇政, 李岩. 中国的高速铁路建设与城市经济增长[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 18 -33 .
[3] 况伟大, 王琪琳. 房价波动、房贷规模与银行资本充足率[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 34 -48 .
[4] 祝树金, 赵玉龙. 资源错配与企业的出口行为——基于中国工业企业数据的经验研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 49 -64 .
[5] 陈德球, 陈运森, 董志勇. 政策不确定性、市场竞争与资本配置[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 65 -80 .
[6] 牟敦果, 王沛英. 中国能源价格内生性研究及货币政策选择分析[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 81 -95 .
[7] 高铭, 江嘉骏, 陈佳, 刘玉珍. 谁说女子不如儿郎?——P2P投资行为与过度自信[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 96 -111 .
[8] 吕若思, 刘青, 黄灿, 胡海燕, 卢进勇. 外资在华并购是否改善目标企业经营绩效?——基于企业层面的实证研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 112 -127 .
[9] 姜军, 申丹琳, 江轩宇, 伊志宏. 债权人保护与企业创新[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 128 -142 .
[10] 刘莎莎, 孔高文. 信息搜寻、个人投资者交易与股价联动异象——基于股票送转的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 143 -157 .
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed   
版权所有 © 《金融研究》编辑部
本系统由北京玛格泰克科技发展有限公司设计开发 技术支持:support@magtech.com.cn
京ICP备11029882号-1