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金融研究  2016, Vol. 430 Issue (4): 99-114    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
高息委托贷款与企业创新
余琰, 李怡宗
北京工商大学商学院,北京 100048;
北京大学光华管理学院,北京 100871
High-interest Entrusted Loans and Corporate Innovation
YU Yan, LEE Yi-tsung
Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University;
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
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摘要 本文分析了参与以高息委托贷款为代表的影子银行业务对企业创新活动和未来业绩的影响。通过结合管理层的短视理论,本文分析了企业从事高息委托贷款后企业创新活动变化以及盈利水平和构成的变化。结果表明,当年从事高息委托贷款降低了企业未来的专利产出水平和投入水平,并伴随未来营业利润资产收益率更低和营业外利润资产收益率更高的情形。进一步的分析表明,从事高息委托贷款与否与公司整体盈利能力没有显著差异,更多表现出盈利结构上的差异,说明从事高息委托贷款的根本动机是源于管理层的短视。
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余琰
李怡宗
关键词:  高息委托贷款  创新活动  管理层短视    
Abstract:  This paper analyzes the impact of engagement of high-interest entrusted loans and corporate innovation activities from the perspective of myopia. Based on myopia theory, our paper analysis firms' innovation activities changes and the level and composition of profitability changes after engagement of high-interest entrusted loans. The results show companies who have high-interest entrusted loans will have lower the future patent outputs and lower R&D expenditure, lower operating profit and higher non-operating profit. Further analysis show that there is no significant difference in overall profitability between companies with high-interest entrusted loans and who don't. This indicates engagement of high-interest entrusted loans is more likely to be triggered by myopia of managers. This paper also contributes to understandings of firm’s behavior under the background of interest rate liberalization.
Key words:  High-interest Entrusted Loans    Corporate Innovation    Myopia
JEL分类号:  E42   G32   G38  
基金资助: 本文感谢国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:71172025,71502007)、北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心(编号:GZ20130801、GZ20131002)的资助
作者简介:  余 琰,博士,北京工商大学商学院讲师,国有资产管理协同创新中心研究员,Email:yuyan@btbu.edu.cn.李怡宗,博士,北京大学光华管理学院教授,Email:ytlee@gsm.pku.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
余琰, 李怡宗. 高息委托贷款与企业创新[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 430(4): 99-114.
YU Yan, LEE Yi-tsung. High-interest Entrusted Loans and Corporate Innovation. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 430(4): 99-114.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2016/V430/I4/99
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