Who Can Dominant Chinese Catastrophe Insurance Construction and Development: Government or Market? Based on Dynamic Path Dependence Evolutionary Analysis
ZHUO Zhi, DUAN Sheng
Shandong University of Finance and Economics; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Abstract:
Based on the assumption, this paper build a dynamic game model to analyze the evolution and development of catastrophe insurance system by information economics evolutionary game path method.The results showed that:in the initial stage, institutional framework and operating rules under the government dominate nation can play a better overall efficiency and can achieve stable equilibrium. But if the government lasting dominated catastrophe insurance system, it will seriously distort the market mechanism and institutional system operating efficiency will also be significantly reduced. Thus suggests, government intervene catastrophe insurance system should be moderate; the main duty for government is cultivate the insurance market players and improve the effectiveness for government incentives.
卓志, 段胜. 中国巨灾保险制度:政府抑或市场主导？——基于动态博弈的路径演化分析[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 434(8): 85-94.
ZHUO Zhi, DUAN Sheng. Who Can Dominant Chinese Catastrophe Insurance Construction and Development: Government or Market? Based on Dynamic Path Dependence Evolutionary Analysis. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 434(8): 85-94.
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