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金融研究  2016, Vol. 435 Issue (9): 161-176    
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反腐败、企业绩效及其渠道效应——基于中共十八大的反腐建设的研究
钟覃琳,陆正飞,袁淳
北京大学光华管理学院,北京 100871;
中央财经大学会计学院,北京 100081
Anti-corruption,Firm Performance and Channel Effects:Based on Anti-corruption Campaign of 18th CPC National Congress
ZHONG Qinlin, LU Zhengfei, YUAN Chun
Guanghua School of Management,Peking University;
School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics
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摘要 本文借助十八大掀起的一系列反腐行动作为外生冲击,通过观测上市公司商旅招待费在反腐败前后的变化水平,在控制相关因素后能在一定效用范围内识别出企业的腐败水平。为了有效缓解内生性问题,本文采用了市场反应模型和DID模型系统地检验了腐败对于微观经济的影响。研究发现:(1)十八大的召开给腐败严重的企业带来了更积极的市场反应;(2)反腐败能提高企业绩效,并且这种效应在政府干预严重的区域更显著;(3)渠道效应研究表明,反腐败通过加快资产周转率,缩短经营周期,优化投资效率,提高生产效率这些中介渠道,最终作用于企业的绩效表现。本文为反腐败的实施成效提供了微观角度的实证证据,并系统性地验证了腐败对经济造成的负面影响。
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钟覃琳
陆正飞
袁淳
关键词:  反腐败  市场反应  企业绩效  渠道效应    
Abstract:  Employing the convening of 18th CPC National Congress and business entertainment expenses, we can detect the corruption level based on the changes due to anti-corruption after controlling related factors. Considering the endogeneity, we utilize market reaction model and difference-in-differences model in order to systematically explore the effects of anti-corruption on microeconomic units. We find that Anti-corruption can win more positive market reaction for corruption firms; Then, Anti-corruption can promote firm performance, especially for firms located in region with severe government intervention; finally, we find some channels through which anti-corruption imposes influences on microeconomic firms: accelerate asset turnover, curtail business cycle, optimize investment efficiency and stimulate productivity. Our work provides micro-level evidence for the implementation effects of anti-corruption and systematically confirms the negative economic effects of corruption, which will provide solid theoretical basis for anti-corruption campaign.
Key words:  Anti-corruption    Market Reaction    Firm Performance    Channel Effects
JEL分类号:  D22   L20   L51  
基金资助: 作者感谢国家自科基金重点项目(71132004)和财政部“会计名家培养工程”(财政部财会[2013]27号文)对本文的资助。
作者简介:  钟覃琳,北京大学光华管理学院,博士研究生,Email:zhongqinlin@pku.edu.cn.陆正飞,经济学博士,北京大学光华管理学院教授,Email:zflu@gsm.pku.edu.cn.袁 淳,会计学博士,中央财经大学会计学院教授,Email:yuanchun@vip.sina.com.
引用本文:    
钟覃琳, 陆正飞, 袁淳. 反腐败、企业绩效及其渠道效应——基于中共十八大的反腐建设的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 435(9): 161-176.
ZHONG Qinlin, LU Zhengfei, YUAN Chun. Anti-corruption,Firm Performance and Channel Effects:Based on Anti-corruption Campaign of 18th CPC National Congress. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 435(9): 161-176.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2016/V435/I9/161
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