Abstract:
In this paper, we select 166 city commercial banks and rural commercial banks in China as sample from 2006 to 2015. Based on provincial judicial data of china and discipline inspection data of CPC, we explore the effects of occupational crimes on bank risk by System GMM. This paper get the conclusions: (1) The rise of occupational crimes will led to the rise of bank risk; (2) Occupational crimes have less influence on the bank with better risk management; (3) Occupational crimes have more influence on the bank with more profitability; (4) The higher the level of the grabbing hand, the more the effects of occupational crimes on the bank risk; (5) The lower the level of legal, the more the effects of occupational crimes on the bank risk. Suggestions are given according to the conclusions.
史永东, 王龑. 职务犯罪是否加剧了银行风险？——来自中国城商行和农商行的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 447(9): 99-114.
SHI Yongdong, WANG Yan. Do Occupational Crimes Increase Bank Risk？: Empirical Evidence from City Commercial Banks and Rural Commercial Banks in China. Journal of Financial Research, 2017, 447(9): 99-114.
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