Abstract:
Using panel data of Chinese listed firms from 2002 to 2011 and applying the Difference-in-Difference (DID) method, this paper first studies how split-share reform differently affects the state ownership among firms in strategic and non-strategic industries. Furthermore, split-share reform, as an exogenous policy change, justifies the use of Instrument Variable (IV) method, which helps to build the causal relationship between state ownership and firm performance. The empirical result shows that, the decrease in state ownership of firms in the non-strategic industries is significantly larger than their counterpart in strategic industries. More importantly, the decline of state ownership is significantly and positively associated with increased profitability and market valuation. This paper confirms the positive effect of split-share reform on improving corporate governance and firm efficiency, which provides empirical evidence for the assessment of relevant policies.
林莞娟, 王辉, 韩涛. 股权分置改革对国有控股比例以及企业绩效影响的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 427(1): 192-206.
LIN Wanchuan, WANG Hui, HAN Tao. Split-share Reform, State Ownership and Performance of Chinese Public Firms: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 427(1): 192-206.
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