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金融研究  2026, Vol. 554 Issue (8): 170-187    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
数字金融的投资者福利效应——基于基金直播数据的识别
宁炜, 庄园, 姜富伟
Digital Finance and Investor Welfare: Identification Based on Mutual Fund Livestreaming
NING Wei, ZHUANG Yuan, JIANG Fuwei
School of Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics;China School of Banking and Finance, University of International Business and Economics;Center for Macroeconomic Research/School of Economics/ The Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics, Xiamen University
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摘要 本文利用支付宝基金直播数据、投资者观看直播数据和账户级交易数据,实证检验基金直播这一数字技术在金融领域的典型应用对投资者福利的影响及其微观机制。研究表明,投资者观看基金直播后,会表现出强烈的申购意愿,且其投资组合收益率会上升,组合波动率会下降,初步证明了基金直播可以改善投资者福利。同时,基金直播具备空间溢出效应和长周期效应。在横截面上,观看基金直播可显著提升投资者整体投资组合、以及组合中其他持有但未观看过直播的基金投资表现;在时间维度上,观看基金直播可提升投资者在未来3个月、6个月和12个月的投资收益率,并降低对应周期的收益率波动率。微观机制方面,本文发现基金直播具备显著投资者教育功能,观看基金直播可显著降低投资者业绩追逐、频繁交易、过度自信以及处置效应这四类典型的投资者行为偏差。本研究为数字技术发展改善投资者福利提供了经验证据,有助于在数字经济发展过程中更好落实以人民为中心的发展理念。
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宁炜
庄园
姜富伟
关键词:  数字经济  基金直播  投资者福利  行为偏差  金融教育    
Summary:  Digital finance is transforming the production and delivery of wealth management services, but its consequences for household investors remain ambiguous. Digital platforms may lower information and communication frictions, broaden access to professional financial knowledge, and improve investment decisions. Yet platform traffic allocation and scale-oriented sales incentives may also intensify persuasion, attention capture, and conflicts of interest. This paper studies mutual fund livestreaming, a rapidly expanding digital-finance application that combines product promotion, market commentary, risk disclosure, and real-time communication. We examine whether livestreaming merely digitizes conventional fund distribution or also improves investor welfare through information provision and financial education.
  We combine proprietary livestreaming records from Alipay with anonymized account-level viewing, holdings, transactions, investment gains and losses, and demographic information for a random sample of 50,000 active mutual fund investors. The underlying fund-level data cover actively managed equity-oriented funds from November 2020 to October 2022 and are supplemented with fund characteristics, net asset values, and portfolio data from Wind. We identify the effect of investors’ first exposure to a fund livestream using a staggered difference-in-differences design. Treated investors are matched to investors who never watch a livestream on the basis of pre-treatment wealth, portfolio holdings, returns, net flows, age, and city characteristics. The regressions include investor and time fixed effects, with two-way clustered standard errors. Event-study tests, alternative variable definitions, sample restrictions, subsample analyses, and an instrumental-variable strategy exploiting within-family crowding-out of livestream resources further address selection and endogeneity concerns.
  The evidence first reveals a significant sales-reach effect: after viewing livestreams, investors subscribe more, redeem less, and record higher net purchases. More importantly, the increase in purchases is accompanied by better investment outcomes rather than greater risk-taking. Relative to matched non-viewers, viewers earn higher portfolio returns and excess returns, experience lower return volatility, and achieve higher Sharpe ratios. In the baseline difference-in-differences estimates, next-month portfolio returns rise by 0.80 percentage points, excess returns rise by 0.40 percentage points, volatility declines by 0.69 percentage points, and the Sharpe ratio increases by 0.13. The effect is not confined to the funds whose livestreams investors actually watch. Funds held but not viewed also exhibit improved returns, lower volatility, and better risk-adjusted performance, indicating a within-portfolio spillover. The benefits are persistent: over three-, six-, and twelve-month horizons, viewers’ cumulative returns increase by 0.72, 3.65, and 8.59 percentage points, while corresponding return volatility declines by 0.31, 4.13, and 5.21 percentage points respectively.
  Mechanism tests support an investor-education interpretation. Livestream exposure weakens investors’ tendency to chase historical performance, high rankings, lottery-like returns, and salient payoff signals. It also reduces portfolio turnover, the fraction and number of funds traded, and purchases of new funds. In addition, viewing lowers overconfidence and mitigates the disposition effect by reducing premature sales of winning funds and increasing the realization of losing positions. Taken together, these findings suggest that livestreams improve investors’ information processing, risk understanding, and trading discipline across fund selection, trading, belief formation, and portfolio management. The evidence therefore indicates a systematic improvement in decision quality rather than a temporary response to platform attention or promotional content.
  This paper contributes to the literature by providing direct account-level evidence on the welfare effects of a specific digital wealth-management service, distinguishing investor service from digital persuasion, and linking portfolio outcomes to four canonical behavioral biases within a unified framework. The findings imply that regulatory framework should integrate digital technologies, information presentation, recommendation algorithms, and realized investor welfare; require balanced disclosure of returns and risks; and discourage traffic-driven promotion and excessive transaction inducement. Digital platforms can also be incorporated into public investor-education systems, while wealth-management institutions should shift from seller-driven distribution toward buyer-oriented advisory services centered on investors’ long-term interests. Future research may combine account data with livestream transcripts, video features, presenter characteristics, and real-time interactions to identify which content elements generate the observed welfare gains and whether the results generalize across platforms, products, and market cycles.
Keywords:  Digital Economy    Mutual Fund Livestreaming    Investor Welfare    Behavioral Bias    Financial Education
JEL分类号:  G11   G20   G28  
基金资助: * 本文感谢国家自然科学基金项目(72072193、72342019、72403203、72503036)、国家社科基金项目(25VRC056)、教育部人文社会科学基金项目(22YJC790195、24YJC790138)和福建省自然科学基金项目(2026J001048)的支持。感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见,感谢数字经济开放研究平台的支持。本研究所用数据均为抽样和脱敏后在蚂蚁开放研究实验室分析,论文作者仅通过远程访问蚂蚁集团域内的实验室开展实证分析,文责自负。
通讯作者:  庄 园,金融学博士,副教授,对外经济贸易大学中国金融学院,E-mail:yuanzhuang@uibe.edu.cn.   
作者简介:  宁 炜,经济学博士,副教授,西南财经大学金融学院,E-mail:ningwei@swufe.edu.cn
姜富伟,金融学博士,教授,厦门大学宏观经济研究中心/经济学院/王亚南经济研究院,E-mail: fwjiang@xmu.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
宁炜, 庄园, 姜富伟. 数字金融的投资者福利效应——基于基金直播数据的识别[J]. 金融研究, 2026, 554(8): 170-187.
NING Wei, ZHUANG Yuan, JIANG Fuwei. Digital Finance and Investor Welfare: Identification Based on Mutual Fund Livestreaming. Journal of Financial Research, 2026, 554(8): 170-187.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2026/V554/I8/170
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