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金融研究  2016, Vol. 427 Issue (1): 83-98    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
保证担保、抵押担保与贷款风险缓释机制探究——来自非上市中小微企业的证据
张晓玫, 宋卓霖
西南财经大学金融学院,四川成都 611130
Guarantee, Collateral and Loan Risk Mitigation Mechanisms: Evidence from Unlisted SMEs
ZHANG Xiaomei, SONG Zhuolin
School of Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
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摘要 本文以2010~2013年某大型银行的非上市中小微企业贷款数据为样本,比较了保证担保与抵押担保两种担保方式在贷款风险缓释方面的差异。研究发现,与抵押担保贷款相比,保证担保贷款的对象具有高风险特征,贷款的违约风险也更高。这意味着保证担保不但没有缓解贷款中的信息不对称,反而加剧了逆向选择与道德风险。从现实来看,不合理的“银担”风险分担机制以及保证人专业性不足是造成这一现象的主要原因。研究还发现,银企关系提高了银行的信息优势,减少了银行对保证担保贷款的发放。
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张晓玫
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关键词:  保证担保  抵押担保  信息不对称    
Abstract:  The paper, using 2010~2013 unlisted SMEs loan data of some large bank as samples, compares the differences between guarantee and collateral in terms of information asymmetry and risk mitigation from the ex-ante and ex-post aspects. We find that compared with those obtaining collateralized loans, enterprises which obtain loans with a third-party guarantee are characterized by high-risk, and they also have a high default risk after controlling for the enterprises’ risk. The findings indicate that third-party guarantee not only fails to ease information asymmetry, but also aggravates the adverse selection and moral hazard. Irrational "bank-guarantor" risk-sharing mechanisms as well as the lack of professionalism of the guarantor are the main causes of this phenomenon. We also find that bank relationship strengthens the banks’ information advantage, and so reduces banks’ use for guarantee.
Key words:  Guarantee    Collateral    Information Asymmetry
JEL分类号:  G21   G23   G14  
基金资助: 本文感谢国家自然科学基金青年项目(批准号:71503210)和中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(批准号:JBK160920)以及“中央高校基本科研业务费”西南财经大学博士研究生科研课题(批准号:JBK1407041)资助。
通讯作者:  宋卓霖,博士研究生,西南财经大学金融学院,Email:momochasong@163.com.   
作者简介:  张晓玫,日本一桥大学经济学博士,副教授,西南财经大学金融学院,Email:xiaomei51@swufe.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
张晓玫, 宋卓霖. 保证担保、抵押担保与贷款风险缓释机制探究——来自非上市中小微企业的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 427(1): 83-98.
ZHANG Xiaomei, SONG Zhuolin. Guarantee, Collateral and Loan Risk Mitigation Mechanisms: Evidence from Unlisted SMEs. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 427(1): 83-98.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2016/V427/I1/83
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