Abstract:
Using Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale of commercial banks from 2006 to 2012, this paper investigates the causes and economic consequences of commercial banks’ engagement in shadow banking. We find that the Big-four state-owned commercial banks, banks with higher ROA, smaller size, higher loan ratio, higher deposit ratio and banks in more financially developed provinces have less Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale, which indicates that pressure of financial performance and external financial development level are important factors for commercial banks to do the interbank business. Further study shows that the size of Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale is positively related to the risk of commercial banks. Specifically, Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale increases the risk of commercial banks through lowering ROA. But the negative effect of Redemptory Monetary Capital for Sale on ROA is not statistically significant when banks have a high Loan-to-Deposit ratio, indicating that one important motivation for commercial banks to engage in shadow banking is to avoid the negative effect of regulation’s restriction on their financial performance.
祝继高, 胡诗阳, 陆正飞. 商业银行从事影子银行业务的影响因素与经济后果——基于影子银行体系资金融出方的实证研究[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 427(1): 66-82.
ZHU Jigao, HU Shiyang, LU Zhengfei. The Causes and Economic Consequences of Commercial Banks’ Engagement in Shadow Banking: From the Perspective of Outflow of Capital in Shadow Banking. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 427(1): 66-82.
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