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金融研究  2022, Vol. 504 Issue (6): 1-15    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
创新内含碳中和目标的结构性货币政策
朱民, 彭道菊
清华大学国家金融研究院,北京;
首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院,北京 100026
New Structural Monetary Policy Mandate with Carbon Neutrality Goals
ZHU Min, PENG Daoju
National Institute of Financial Research, Tsinghua University;
International School of Economics and Management, Capital University of Economics and Business
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摘要 2020年9月,我国提出努力争取2060年前实现碳中和,宣示了向低碳经济转型的战略。在实现碳中和目标过程中,货币政策起着极其重要的金融稳定、风险防控、融资引导作用,也将在其间经历相应调整。本文归纳总结了目前国内外对结构性货币政策的理论探讨和政策实践,分析了构建与碳中和一致的结构性货币政策的必要性,提出在碳中和目标下货币政策应采取更为积极的立场主动促进经济低碳转型,走向包含碳中和目标的结构性货币政策。本文同时讨论了构建与碳中和一致的结构性货币政策框架面临的理论和政策挑战,并提出了相关政策建议。
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朱民
彭道菊
关键词:  碳中和  结构货币政策  市场中性    
Summary:  Climate change is becoming an important threat to the world. Should monetary policy take a more proactive stance and promote the transition to carbon neutrality? Controversy remains in academic and policy circles on this issue. In this paper, we propose that it is necessary to include carbon neutrality goals in normalized structural monetary for three reasons. First, the transition to carbon neutrality affects existing monetary policy frameworks. Second, carbon emissions have negative externalities. Third, a single fiscal policy cannot effectively promote the transition to carbon neutrality.
The central bank can correct market failures through macro and structural monetary policies, and can facilitate financial markets to allocate more resources to green sectors. When there is a huge difference between the private and social benefits of commercial bank lending, restricting the flow of credit has social benefits. In practice, using structural monetary policy to facilitate the transition to carbon neutrality may have advantages over using fiscal policy. Structural monetary policy mainly acts between the central bank and financial institutions,changes the incentive compatibility condition of financial institutions and promotes the credit allocation to specific industries; it also utilizes the professional advantages of financial institutions in information collection, monitoring, and risk diversification and avoids the potential for bias in some fiscal policies. However, there are still three major challenges to construct a structural monetary policy consistent with carbon neutrality.
The first challenge is determining the theoretical framework for an active structural monetary policy consistent with carbon neutrality. The second challenge is establishing the goals, mediating variables, and transmission mechanisms for an active structural monetary policy that is consistent with carbon neutrality. The final challenge is balancing carbon neutrality goals and other central bank goals. Carbon neutrality goals may conflict with other policy objectives such as maintaining financial stability.
We propose three policy recommendations to build a structural monetary policy that is consistent with the transition to carbon neutrality. First, central banks can establish a structural monetary policy model that is compatible with the transition to carbon neutrality. Central banks can strengthen the monitoring of energy (oil, coal, new energy, etc.), agricultural products, and carbon prices, and can study the impact of changes in energy supply and prices on overall prices. Structural output and consumption changes can be added to these models. Joint research can also be conducted on the macroeconomic impact of monetary policy and carbon-neutral transition policies such as carbon tax, carbon subsidy, and carbon price in a structural monetary policy model. Second, central banks can study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the presence of the transition to carbon neutrality. The People's Bank of China has established a short-term interest rate corridor with the standing lending facility (SLF) interest rate as the upper limit, the excess reserve interest rate as the lower limit, and the medium-term lending facility (MLF) interest rate as the medium-term policy interest rate, and has established a loan market from the MLF interest rate to the loan market. It is necessary to study the impact of the carbon price and carbon risk on interest rate transmission upon obtaining the necessary information on the carbon price and carbon risk. The mediating variables and goals of the carbon-neutral structural monetary policy are established. Third, central banks can establish and extend structural quantitative policy tools, including a green quantitative monetary policy framework covering the deposit reserve ratio, liquidity adjustment tools, and non-financial sector credit tools to fully support the low-carbon transition, improve the collateral framework management in the re-lending policy, expand the green collateral framework, create new re-lending facilities, and use the “window guidelines” to provide financing support for carbon-neutral emerging industries.
The People's Bank of China has always been a practitioner of structural monetary policy, and it already leads the research on structural monetary policy consistent with carbon neutrality. It is necessary to continue to focus on these important issues, such as how to optimally structure the central bank's monetary policy, how to balance the relationship between structured policy objectives and conventional objectives, how to balance the relationship between structured monetary policy and government-related functions, and to determine the roles of and relationship between structural monetary policy and markets. Based on the rich practices and continuing theoretical discussions, the People's Bank of China is expected to be at the forefront of the world in innovating structural monetary policy in accordance with the transition to carbon neutrality.
Keywords:  Carbon Neutrality    Structural Monetary Policy    Market Neutrality
JEL分类号:  Q54 E50 E59 A11  
基金资助: * 本文感谢国家自然科学基金(项目号:71603172)的资助。感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见,文责自负。
通讯作者:  彭道菊,经济学博士,副教授,首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院,E-mail:pengdaoju@cueb.edu.cn.   
作者简介:  朱民,经济学博士,教授,清华大学国家金融研究院,E-mail:mzhu2016@qq.com.
引用本文:    
朱民, 彭道菊. 创新内含碳中和目标的结构性货币政策[J]. 金融研究, 2022, 504(6): 1-15.
ZHU Min, PENG Daoju. New Structural Monetary Policy Mandate with Carbon Neutrality Goals. Journal of Financial Research, 2022, 504(6): 1-15.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V504/I6/1
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