Central Bank Communication and Shadow Banking of Non-Financial Enterprises
HAN Xun, YI Zhen, QIAO Jiaxue
School of Economics, Beijing International Studies University; School of Finance, Capital University of Economics and Business; Institute of America Latina, Chinese Academy of Social Science
Summary:
The scale of China's shadow banking sector continues to expand in recent years. Non-financial enterprise sectors are engaging in financial asset investment activities.This has led more enterprises to shift human resources and capital from their original production and operation areas to financial asset investment and shadow lending activities. The shadow banking of enterprises decreases the physical investment rate and exacerbates systemic financial risks. Since the 1990s, global central banks have gradually increased their emphasis on central bank communication and used it as a means of macroeconomic policy regulation. The central bank uses verbal communication to announce the direction of its future monetary policy implementation, which helps the public form expectations about changes in the economic state, sufficient credit liquidity, and financial regulatory intensity, thereby influencing the behavior of micro residents and enterprises. Therefore, leveraging the regulatory role of monetary authorities in the investment and financing behavior of micro enterprise entities, exploring methods to resolve financial risks, and curbing the excessive development of the shadow banking system have become important efforts for government decision-making departments and domestic and foreign scholars. This paper constructs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to simulate the relationship between central bank communication and corporate shadow banking business. Then, based on quarterly data from listed companies from 2007 to 2020, it conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between central bank communication and the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises. This paper makes three main contributions. First, starting from the perspective of central bank communication, it analyzes the reasons for changes in the corporate shadow banking scale. It also proposes the impact of central bank communication on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises, which has a strong innovation in research perspective. Second, this paper explores and elaborates on the mechanism through which central bank communication affects the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises, and it theoretically supplements existing research. Third, this paper examines the impact of the consistency of the central bank's words and actions on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises, thus further supplementing and extending the theoretical research on central bank communication. The findings indicate that central bank communication can inhibit the shadow banking behavior of non-financial enterprises. The above effects are enhanced in companies whose executives have a financial background, a strong awareness of social responsibility, and low corporate governance efficiency. The mechanism analysis shows that central bank communication suppresses the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises by suppressing the degree of financial mismatch, improving investment stability, and reducing the difference between financial and physical returns. Central bank communication can not only alleviate heterogeneous investor beliefs but also reduce divergence in analyst predictions. The impact of central bank communication meetings on enterprises and capital market participants is mainly reflected in reducing investor belief heterogeneity and analyst prediction divergence. In addition, the consistency of the words and actions of the central bank has a negative impact on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises, while risk warning communication has a reverse regulatory effect on the relationship between central bank communication and enterprise shadow banking. Based on the findings of this paper,two policy recommendations can be made. First, the important role of central bank communication in stabilizing expectations and adjusting economic structure must be emphasized, the coordination and cooperation between traditional monetary policy and central bank communication must also be underscored, and the important role of central bank communication in managing public expectations, improving resource allocation efficiency, and stabilizing investor sentiment must be fully leveraged. Second, the transparency of monetary policy must be enhanced, the functional supervision of regulatory authorities must be strengthened, the timely disclosure of relevant information (e.g., on corporate operations and finances) must be reinforced, and the degree of information asymmetry among capital market participants must be alleviated to curb the rampant growth of shadow lending behavior.
韩珣, 易祯, 乔佳雪. 中央银行沟通与非金融企业影子银行化[J]. 金融研究, 2023, 522(12): 20-37.
HAN Xun, YI Zhen, QIAO Jiaxue. Central Bank Communication and Shadow Banking of Non-Financial Enterprises. Journal of Financial Research, 2023, 522(12): 20-37.
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