Abstract:
Using the method of ultimate controlling shareholder retrospective with 2010-2014 city commercial bank data,the article reveals the great difference of the local government’s financial holding model to the city commercial bank, and the difference is the result of the local government's endogenous choice based on regional endowments.Essentially holding pattern of the local government is the problem of optimal capital allocation driven by the economic growth,specifically the trade-off between inefficient SOEs and efficient private enterprises considering the former’s control benefit.As the first choice,SOEs’ capital requirement greatly affect local government’s holding pattern,and the requirement is determined by numerous factors such as proportion of state-owned economy,financial situation, financial competition.We find that:local government with low proportion of state-owned economy tend to exit control;when state-owned economy is high,local government with financial deficit tend to exit control,local government with low proportion of state-owned economy and financial deficit tend to increase control;local government with higher level of regional financial institutions monopoly tend to exit control.
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HONG Zheng, ZHANG Shuonan, ZHANG Lin. Economic Structure,Fiscal Capacity and the Local Government’s FinancialHolding Pattern of City Commercial Bank. Journal of Financial Research, 2017, 448(10): 83-98.
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