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金融研究  2017, Vol. 446 Issue (8): 192-206    DOI: 10.12094/1002-7246(2017)08-0192-15
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国际化董事会、分析师关注与现金股利分配
杜兴强, 谭雪
厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门 361005
The Globalizing Board, Analyst Coverage,and Cash Dividend
DU Xingqiang, TAN Xue
School of Management, Xiamen University
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摘要 基于手工收集的、中国上市公司2004-2014年国际化董事会的数据,本文实证研究了国际化董事会对公司现金股利分配的影响。研究发现,国际化董事会显著增加了现金股利支付率,但分析师关注负向调节了国际化董事会与现金股利之间的正向关系。考虑半强制分红政策后发现,相对于政策变更后的期间,国际化董事会对现金股利的正向影响在政策变更前的期间影响更大。采纳其他方法度量国际化董事会与现金股利、并控制了国际化董事会与现金股利的内生性后,上述结论依然成立。此外,国际化董事会对现金股利分配的正向影响仅存在于高市场化子样本与非国有企业子样本中。
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杜兴强
谭雪
关键词:  国际化董事会  分析师关注  现金股利    
Abstract:  Using a sample of Chinese listed firms for the period of 2004-2014 and hand-collected data on the globalizing board, this study empirically investigates the effect of the globalizing board on cash dividend. Our findings show that the globalizing board has a significantly positive impact on cash dividend. Moreover, analyst coverage attenuates the positive association between the globalizing board and cash dividend. Furthermore, after considering the semi-mandatory dividend policy, our findings show that the positive association between the globalizing board and cash dividend is significantly stronger for pre-2008 period than for post-2008 period. Above findings are robust to alternative measures of the globalizing board and cash dividend and further our conclusions are still valid after controlling for the potential endogeneity between the globalizing board and cash dividend. Results of subsample tests show that the positive effect of the globalizing board on cash dividend only exists for the subsamples of higher Marketization and non-state-owned enterprises.
Key words:  The Globalizing Board    Analyst Coverage    Cash Dividend
JEL分类号:  C31   G24   G35  
基金资助: 国家自然科学基金(71572162)。
作者简介:  杜兴强,会计学博士,教授,厦门大学管理学院,Email: xqdu@xmu.edu.cn.
谭 雪,会计学博士研究生,厦门大学管理学院,Email: 2008tanxue@163.com.
引用本文:    
杜兴强, 谭雪. 国际化董事会、分析师关注与现金股利分配[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 446(8): 192-206.
DU Xingqiang, TAN Xue. The Globalizing Board, Analyst Coverage,and Cash Dividend. Journal of Financial Research, 2017, 446(8): 192-206.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/10.12094/1002-7246(2017)08-0192-15  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2017/V446/I8/192
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