Abstract:
Based on unbalanced panel data of commercial banks in China over the year of 2004 to 2014, this paper analyzes the effect of capital quality on bank lending behavior. The empirical analysis yields the following results: (1) capital adequacy ratio inhibits bank loans, while core capital adequacy ratio has the positive effect on bank lending. Both the effect is enhanced during the financial crisis, but is weakened during the Basel III regulation expected period. Leverage ratio really increases the caution of bank lending during Basel III regulatory expected period. (2) For loans structure, personal loans’ growth rate is more sensitive to the capital quality than the corporate loans’. Leverage ratio can support the banks issue corporate loans effectively during the financial crisis. (3) For industry loans, if banks have high core capital adequacy ratio, their real estate loans’ growth is lower but manufacturing loans’ growth is higher, and this preference reduces during the financial crisis and Basel III regulation expected period.
江曙霞, 刘忠璐. 资本质量会影响银行贷款行为吗？[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 438(12): 63-77.
JIANG Shuxia, LIU Zhonglu. Does Capital Quality Affect Bank Lending Behavior?. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 438(12): 63-77.
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