Summary:
“Socialism with Chinese characteristics” has entered a new era, in which the major social contradiction is between people's growing needs for a better life and the problem of inadequate and unbalanced development. China must address the current reality of severe environmental pollution as the same time as alleviating these major social contradictions. Environmental problems have many externalities, and thus environmental pollution control relies heavily on environmental regulation to internalize external costs. The “Porter hypothesis” suggests that reasonable and strict environmental regulation can promote enterprises' technological innovation; the resulting first-mover advantage can compensate for the costs of environmental regulation and achieve a win-win situation. Based on this argument, formulating and implementing appropriate and effective environmental regulation policies that realize the Porter hypothesis have become a key issue in the process of building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era. Depending on the regulatory bodies and mechanisms involved, environmental regulation can be divided into two types: command control and market incentive. Since the beginning of the 21st century, market-incentive environmental regulation policies have been gradually implemented in China. Around 2002, China tentatively established an emissions trading policy mainly for sulfur dioxide emissions. In June 2013, China pioneered the introduction of a carbon emissions trading mechanism originating in the developed capital markets of Europe and the United States, and it successively established carbon trading exchanges in seven regions. At the end of 2017, the National Development and Reform Commission announced an official nationwide launch of a unified market for carbon emissions trading. This gradual development of a carbon emissions trading mechanism indicates that China's environmental regulation system is gradually shifting from command control to market incentives. This paper uses data on Chinese listed companies from 2011 to 2016, based on the analytical framework of Porter hypothesis, and tests whether the carbon emissions trading mechanism can promote technological innovation. This paper finds that the implementation of carbon emissions trading has significantly promoted technological innovation in regulated enterprises. However, the positive effects of carbon emissions trading on firm innovation are constrained in two aspects. First, the positive effects of carbon emissions trading on the technological innovation of enterprises is stronger if the carbon market is more liquid. Second, the positive effects decrease if the industry in which the company is located is less competitive and the concentration of customers or suppliers is lower. The main contributions of our study are as follows. First, based on the Chinese institutional background, relevant studies have paid more attention to the policy effects of command control environmental regulation. In contrast, this paper focuses on the implemented carbon emissions trading mechanism and tests whether market-incentive environmental regulation can achieve the Porter effect in China. Second, based on the inherent design differences between the seven Chinese carbon trading markets, our paper finds that liquidity constraints in a carbon market will reduce the positive impact of carbon emissions trading on enterprise technology innovation. Third, the relationship between environmental regulation and enterprise technology innovation is a matter of controversy. From an examination of the cost transfer ability of enterprises under environmental regulation, this paper finds that the positive impact of carbon emissions trading on enterprise technology innovation mainly affects enterprises with relatively low cost transfer ability.
[1]傅京燕、章扬帆和谢子雄,2017,《制度设计影响了碳市场流动性吗——基于中国试点地区的研究》,《财贸经济》第8期,第129～143页。 [2]江珂和卢现祥,2011,《环境规制与技术创新——基于中国 1997-2007 年省际面板数据分析》,《科研管理》第7期,第60～66页。 [3]姜付秀和刘志彪,2005,《行业特征、资本结构与产品市场竞争》,《管理世界》第10期,第74～81页。 [4]蒋伏心、王竹君和白俊红,2013,《环境规制对技术创新影响的双重效应》,《中国工业经济》第7期,第44～51页。 [5]颉茂华、王瑾和刘冬梅,2014,《环境规制,技术创新与企业经营绩效》,《南开管理评论》第6期,第106～113页。 [6]李成和张玉霞,2015,《中国“营改增”改革的政策效应:基于双重差分模型的检验》,《财政研究》第2期,第44～49页。 [7]李万福、杜静和张怀,2017,《创新补助究竟有没有激励企业创新自主投资--来自中国上市公司的新证据》,《金融研究》第10期,第130～145页。 [8]李永友和文云飞,2016,《中国排污权交易政策有效性研究——基于自然实验的实证分析》,《经济学家》第5期,第19～28页。 [9]刘晔和张训常,2017,《碳排放交易制度与企业研发创新——基于三重差分模型的实证研究》,《经济科学》第3期,第102～114页。 [10]罗党论和刘晓龙,2009,《政治关系,进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》第5期,第97～106页。 [11]潘越、潘健平和戴亦一,2015,《公司诉讼风险,司法地方保护主义与企业创新》,《经济研究》第3期,第131～145页。 [12]乔睿蕾和陈良华,2017,《税负转嫁能力对“营改增”政策效应的影响——基于现金—现金流敏感性视角的检验》,《中国工业经济》第6期,第117～135页。 [13]权小锋和尹洪英,2017,《中国式卖空机制与公司创新——基于融资融券分步扩容的自然实验》,《管理世界》第1期,第128～144页。 [14]沈洪涛、黄楠和刘浪,2017,《碳排放权交易的微观效果及机制研究》,《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》第1期,第13～22页。 [15]沈能和刘凤朝,2012,《空间溢出,门槛特征与能源效率的经济增长效应》,《中国人口资源与环境》第5期,第153～157页。 [16]童锦治、苏国灿和魏志华,2015,《“营改增”,企业议价能力与企业实际流转税税负——基于中国上市公司的实证研究》,《财贸经济》第11期,第14～26页。 [17]涂正革和谌仁俊,2015,《排污权交易机制在中国能否实现波特效应？》,《经济研究》第7期,第160～173页。 [18]夏立军和陈信元,《市场化进程,国企改革策略与公司治理结构的内生决定》,《经济研究》第7期,第82～95页。 [19]冼国明和明秀南,2018,《海外并购与企业创新》,《金融研究》第8期,第155～171页。 [20]解维敏和方红星,2011,《金融发展,融资约束与企业研发投入》,《金融研究》第5期,第171～183页。 [21]徐敏燕和左和平,2013,《集聚效应下环境规制与产业竞争力关系研究——基于“波特假说”的再检验》,《中国工业经济》第3期,第72～84页。 [22]伊志宏、姜付秀和秦义虎,2010,《产品市场竞争,公司治理与信息披露质量》,《管理世界》第1期,第133～141页。 [23]张成、陆旸和郭路,2011,《环境规制强度和生产技术进步》,《经济研究》第2期,第113～124页。 [24]Ahern, K. R., 2012, “Bargaining Power and Industry Dependence in Mergers”, Journal of Financial Economics, 103(3): 530～550. [25]Bell, R.G., 2013, “Choosing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Real World”, Aper Prepared for the OECD Global Forum on Sustainable Development: Emissions Trading. [26]Clarkson, P. M., Y. Li, and M. Pinnuck., 2015, “The Valuation Relevance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the European Union Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme”, European Accounting Review, 24(3):551～580. [27]Fabra, N., and M. Reguant., 2014, “Pass-Through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets”, American Economic Review, 104(9):2872～2899. [28]Florackis, C., A. Gregoriou, and A. Kostakis., 2011, “Trading Frequency and Asset Pricing on the London Stock Exchange: Evidence from a New Price Impact Ratio”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(12):3335～3350. [29]Johnstone, N., I. HaÅiÄiÄ, and D. Popp., 2010, “Renewable Energy Policies and Technological Innovation: Evidence based on Patent Counts”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 45(1):133～155. [30]Kathuria, V., 2006, “Controlling Water Pollution in Developing and Transition Countries—Lessons from Three Successful Cases”, Journal of Environmental Management, 78(4):405～426. [31]Kneller, R., and E. Manderson., 2012, “Environmental Regulations and Innovation Activity in UK Manufacturing Industries”, Resource and Energy Economics, 34(2):211～235. [32]Lanoie, P., M. Patry, and R. Lajeunesse., 2008, “Environmental Regulation and Productivity: Testing the Porter Hypothesis”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 30(2):121～128. [33]Lee, J., F. M. Veloso, and D. A. Hounshell., 2011, “Linking Induced Technological Change, and Environmental Regulation: Evidence from Patenting in the US Auto Industry”, Research Policy, 40(9):1240～1252. [34]Porter, M. E., and C. V. D. Linde., 1995, “Toward a New Conception of the Environment Competitiveness Relationship”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4):97～118. [35]Porter, M., 1991, “America's Green Strategy”, Scientific American, 264(4):193～246. [36]Ramanathan, R., A. Black, and P. Nath., 2010, “Impact of Environmental Regulations on Innovation and Performance in the UK Industrial Sector”, Management Decision, 48(10):1493～1513. [37]Sijm, J., K. Neuhoff, and Y. Chen., 2006, “CO2 Cost Pass-through and Windfall Profits in the Power Sector”, Climate Policy, 6(1):49～72. [38]Tian, X. and T. Y. Wang, 2014, “Tolerance for Failure and Corporate Innovation”, Review of Financial Studies, 27(11):211～255.
