Summary:
Recent developments in financial markets have shifted researchers' focus from the financial development of the real sector to the development of financial investments. When firms in the real sector engage in too much financial investment, i.e., when they participate in financial market activities and neglect the development and innovation of the main business, the result may be phenomena such as “financialization”, which involves a switch from a “real” economy to a “virtual” economy. Previous studies have examined the negative impact of the financialization of the real economy on corporate management, innovation, and so on, but only a few have focused on a more crucial problem: why do firms favor financial investments？ Studies using appropriate theoretical settings and modeling are urgently needed. One important research question is whether there is any heterogeneity in the financial investment mechanisms of different types of enterprises, and what are the differences？ A scientific answer to this question will undoubtedly provide policy makers with a more targeted and differentiated approach to regulation. This study uses the portfolio choice model featuring fixed and financial assets, relaxing the model hypothesis and constructing a cross-period portfolio choice model to analyze the heterogeneity of the mechanism that drives the financialization of different types of enterprises. We set up the empirical model based on theoretical expressions, and apply GMM estimation using the panel data on China's A-share listed non-financial firms from the 2006-2016 period. Our analysis focuses on the heterogeneity of the mechanism driving the financial investments of different types of enterprises. We separate financial assets into cash and non-cash financial assets. We divide the main sample into two subsets based on the type of ownership and industry: state-owned enterprises vs. non-state-owned enterprises and manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing groups. The results show that there are obvious differences in the mechanisms driving financial investment. The non-state-owned enterprises face stronger external financing constraints and higher operational risks; therefore, the motivation to hold financial assets is mainly to avoid risk. State-owned enterprises are mainly restricted by internal cash flow and leverage ratio, and risk aversion is not a significant driving factor. The income from the main business of manufacturing firms depends on fixed assets, which encourages firms to hold financial assets to avoid the fixed investment risk, whereas the financial investment of non-manufacturing firms is mainly driven by the profit motive. We also find that there are apparent differences in the mechanisms driving choices in cash and non-cash financial assets. The cash investment of state-owned enterprises is mainly driven by the profit motive, whereas non-state-owned enterprises do not show this characteristic. The non-cash financial assets investments of non-state-owned, manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms are driven by uncertainty in economic policy, whereas state-owned enterprises are unaffected by this uncertainty. The results are robust to the removal of long-term equity investments in financial assets. For policy makers interested in promoting “financial sectors returning to source” and “financial sectors serving the real economy”, this study's findings have specific policy implications. Strengthening the regulation of investment risk, clearing financing channels, and reducing the uncertainty of real investment should be key targets for policy makers. More importantly, macro policies that are generalized to all enterprises fail to recognize the heterogeneity of enterprises and the different preferences in financial investment. To guide the real economy to participate in investment activities and to help realize the optimal allocation of resources across departments and industries, policies are needed to address the unfair financing environment for non-state-owned enterprises, the “soft budget constraints” of state-owned enterprises, and the high risk of investment in manufacturing industries.
张成思, 郑宁. 中国实业部门金融化的异质性[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 469(7): 1-18.
ZHANG Chengsi, ZHENG Ning. Heterogeneity of the Financialization of the Real Economy in China. Journal of Financial Research, 2019, 469(7): 1-18.
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