Abstract:
Corporate fraud happens in groups recently. Using corporate fraud sample in A-share listed company from 2000-2016, this paper explores the characteristic and factors that affect fraud occurrence from the perspective of “peer effect”. We show a significant positive regional peer effect of corporate fraud in China. Other companies’ fraud significantly raises the company’s probability of breaking the market rules in the same region. “Peer effect” of information disclosure fraud is most obvious among all the fraud type. Corporate frauds contagion regionally mainly through two mechanisms: imitation learning and observation learning. Heterogeneity analysis shows company frauds are more affected by those with the same ownership type in regional peers. Further analysis shows that the possibility of fraud is reduced and the “peer effect” is weakened significantly after China's 18th Party Congress. This analysis reveals the regional peer effect characteristic of corporate fraud and provides an empirical support for regulation activities in recent years from the perspective of inhibiting illegal contagion of behavior.
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