Abstract:
The frequent issuance of inquiry letters by regulators is becoming an important regulatory tool in China's capital markets. This paper investigates the information content and the regulatory role of the no-penalty regulation. Based on the financial report inquiry letter, the authors document that the market reaction to the receipt announcement is significantly negative, while the market reaction to the reply announcement is significantly positive. The announcement of the financial report inquiry letter has information content and the market recognizes the regulatory role of inquiry letters. Moreover, the characteristics of the listed company and the financial report inquiry letter will affect the market reaction. These findings suggest that inquiry letters play a role in information disclosure regulation.
陈运森, 邓祎璐, 李哲. 非处罚性监管具有信息含量吗？——基于问询函的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 454(4): 155-171.
CHEN Yunsen, DENG Yilu, LI Zhe. Does the Non-penalty Regulation Have Information Content?Evidence from Inquiry Letters. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 454(4): 155-171.
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