Abolition of Agricultural Taxation, Agricultural Development and Local Government Behaviors: Evidence from County Data
WANG Fang, CHEN Shuo, WANG Jin
School of Public Administration, East China Normal University; School of Economics, Fudan University; Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Abstract:
This paper assesses the impacts of agricultural tax abolition reform on agricultural productivity, rural incomes and local public finance in China using data covering 1997 Chinese counties and the period from 1999 to 2009 spanning the abolition of agricultural taxation in 2003-05. The abolition was shown to have increased agricultural productivity and rural incomes, but led county governments to reallocate land from the agricultural sector to industrial and commercial uses, which gives them extra-budgetary revenue to compensate for the budgetary loss. These findings illustrate the importance of general equilibrium framework in policy evaluation.
王芳, 陈硕, 王瑾. 农业税减免、农业发展与地方政府行为——县级证据[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 454(4): 104-120.
WANG Fang, CHEN Shuo, WANG Jin. Abolition of Agricultural Taxation, Agricultural Development and Local Government Behaviors: Evidence from County Data. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 454(4): 104-120.
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