IPO Over Funding, Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy
ZHANG Lu, LUO Ting, YUE Heng
Business School & CICSOAA, Beijing Technology and Business University; School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University; Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the influence of IPO overfunding on company’s cash dividend policy. We find that the more excessive funds the companies use to provide liquidity, the higher cash dividend payout ratio they have. This evidence indicates that excessive funds play as a capital pool. In order to meet cash demand of large shareholders, this positive relation between strength of excessive funds to improve liquidity and payment ratio is stronger when large shareholders have more shares. Further studies investigate that the stock market reaction to cash dividend is smaller if companies provide more liquidity with excessive funds after IPO. And the negative relation is lower in firms with higher majority owners’ shareholding, indicating market’s concerns about expropriation from large shareholders. These results deepen our understanding of efficiency of IPO overfunding and then have an enlightening role on the policy makers and investors.
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