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金融研究  2015, Vol. 424 Issue (10): 81-98    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
中国的信用评级真的影响发债成本吗?
寇宗来, 盘宇章, 刘学悦
复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心, 上海 200433
Does Credit Rating Really Affect Debt Issuance Costs in China?
KOU Zonglai, PAN Yuzhang, LIU Xueyue
China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University
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摘要 信用评级制度旨在通过提供真实可靠的公共信息而改善市场效率,但在发行人付费模式和评级选购机制下,信用评级机构的公信力有待检验。由此,本文基于中国债券数据研究了信用评级对企业发债成本的影响。与既有文献一样,OLS分析表明良好的信用评级显著降低了债务融资成本,但考虑到内生性问题,此结果的可信性值得怀疑。基于理论分析和计量判据,我们以各地区评级机构的竞争程度作为债券评级的工具变量重新进行了回归,发现信用评级对发债成本的经济效应明显降低,且该效应在统计上也不再显著。这表明,中国的信用评级机构并没有获得市场认可的公信力,而评级膨胀也不会真正降低企业的发债成本。
   
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寇宗来
盘宇章
刘学悦
关键词:  信用评级  发行人付费模式  评级选购  发债成本    
Abstract:  Credit rating aims to improve market efficiency by supplying credible public information. But due to rating-shopping behavior under the issuer-pay model, the reliability and the creditability of CRAs could be questionable. Based on Chinese corporate bond data, the paper examines how credit rating affects debt issuance costs. Like existing literature, OLS analysis shows that credit rating has significantly negative effect on debt issuance costs. However, the naive analysis suffers from endogeneity bias, and hence its result could be misleading. To tackle the endogeneity problem, we treat the competitiveness between CRAs as the ideal instrument for bond rating, and instrumental-based analysis further outlines that the effect of credit rating on debt issuance costs becomes economically smaller and statistically insignificant. This implies that CRAs in China do not provide valuable information that strongly influences the cost of capital.
Key words:  Credit rating    Issuer-pay model    Rating-shopping    Debt issuance costs
JEL分类号:  D43   G24   L14  
基金资助: *本文感谢国家自然科学基金面上项目(71373050)、教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(14JJD790014)和上海市“曙光计划”项目(13SG09)的资助。感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见。文责自负。
作者简介:  寇宗来,经济学博士,教授,复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心,复旦大学产业发展研究中心,Email:zlkou@fudan.edu.cn. 盘宇章,经济学博士生,复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心,Email:panyuzhang01@gmail.com. 刘学悦,经济学博士生,复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心,Email:liuxy0749@126.com.
引用本文:    
寇宗来, 盘宇章, 刘学悦. 中国的信用评级真的影响发债成本吗?[J]. 金融研究, 2015, 424(10): 81-98.
KOU Zonglai, PAN Yuzhang, LIU Xueyue. Does Credit Rating Really Affect Debt Issuance Costs in China?. Journal of Financial Research, 2015, 424(10): 81-98.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2015/V424/I10/81
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