The Effect of Collateral Security Condition on Small and Micro Enterprise Loan Interest Rate:Empirical Study Based on the Two-tier Stochastic Frontier Model
HUO Yuanyuan, FENG Zongxian, LIU Chun
School of Economics and Finance / Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi'an Jiaotong University
Abstract:
The paper builds up econometric model by two-tier stochastic frontier method which could measure the deviation degree of lending rate dominant power and its impact on banks and small and micro enterprise in collateral security loan market. The empirical analysis shows that enterprises meeting the demand of collateral make the actual rate lower than the benchmark price of 9.46%. The paper implies that banks rely on security too much to judge the quality of the enterprise, which are not only conductive to banks to prevent the credit risk of enterprise but also unfavorable to enterprises raise the availability of funds.
霍源源, 冯宗宪, 柳春. 抵押担保条件对小微企业贷款利率影响效应分析—基于双边随机前沿模型的实证研究[J]. 金融研究, 2015, 423(9): 112-127.
HUO Yuanyuan, FENG Zongxian, LIU Chun. The Effect of Collateral Security Condition on Small and Micro Enterprise Loan Interest Rate:Empirical Study Based on the Two-tier Stochastic Frontier Model. Journal of Financial Research, 2015, 423(9): 112-127.
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