Abstract:
Due to prominent externality of commercial banks, the negative external effect of the banks’ bankruptcy is significantly greater than that of other non-banking enterprises. Particularly the failure of large-scale banks would bring on chain reaction of entire financial system, resulting in some systematic risk, and even severe economic crisis. In the circumstance that a bank is confronting risks leading to technical or economical bankruptcy, actual bankruptcy and liquidation would hardly be carried out, instead the government would bail out the bank regardless of cost by the means of fund injecting, re-lending, credit guaranteeing or asset purchasing. On the other hand, it is widely criticized that the moral hazard is induced by bailing out “too big to fail” banks and taxpayers are forced to bear financial cost of saving the banks taking excessive risks. In order to effectively balance of risk and return during bankruptcy processing, comprehensive competency of banking system and efficiency of financial market should be paid more attention to enhance, and a multi-line defense mechanism preventing banks from failures should be established by strengthening the legislation to regulating bank failures, carrying out macro-prudential regulations in a forward-looking fashion, optimizing “troubled banks” resorting tools, and improving banking governance in the micro management level. This mechanism would be so designed for the residual risks to be restricted within a tolerant range through various means of risk controlling and mitigating. Recent international banking practice since the financial crisis in 2008 has shown that a risk management framework avoiding banks from failures by risk preventing, risk mitigating, and orderly exiting in a pre-cautionary and forward-looking fashion has come to the fore. The enhancement of bankruptcy risk governance and fundamental financial risk managements is a critical issue for financial reform in China as well as a pedestal further boosting the financial market-oriented movements.
黄志凌. 问题银行的判断与破产早期干预机制[J]. 金融研究, 2015, 421(7): 45-59.
HUANG Zhiling. Recognition of Troubled Banks and Early Intervention Mechanism of Bankruptcy. Journal of Financial Research, 2015, 421(7): 45-59.
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