Abstract:
Due to corporate income tax claim on cash flows, state is de facto the largest minority shareholder in almost all companies. This study incorporates corporate income tax into the analysis framework regarding the relationship between controlling shareholders and other minority shareholders, and seeks to investigate the impact of corporate income tax on the tunneling or propping behavior of controlling shareholders. The results suggest that the corporate income tax have two effects on the choice of tunneling or propping, the first one is that corporate tax rate would increase the propensity to choose tunneling rather than propping; the other one is that tax enforcement would decrease the propensity to choose tunneling. When the controlling shareholders intend to tunnel resources, the degree of tunneling increases with the rise of the tax rate and the decrease of the tax enforcement level. When the controlling shareholders intend to prop the firm, the degree of propping increases with the rise of the tax rate and the increase of the tax enforcement level. This paper not only provides new evidence on the determinants of tunneling and propping, but also enriches the literature on tax and agency problem.
王亮亮. 控股股东“掏空”与“支持”:企业所得税的影响[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 452(2): 172-189.
WANG Liangliang. Tunneling and Propping of the Controlling Shareholders: the Effect of Corporate Income Tax. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 452(2): 172-189.
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