摘要 本文采用Feenstra and Romalis(2014)的方法测算了一国贸易产品的质量水平,并通过实证研究发现:1)司法质量和出口质量正相关,但司法质量更高的国家在出口合约密集型产品上并不具有质量意义上的比较优势;2)司法质量更高的国家在进口合约密集型产品上具有质量意义上的比较优势;3)进口国司法质量是影响合约密集型产品相对贸易质量的重要因素,而出口国司法质量则主要影响合约密集型产品的相对贸易数量。
Abstract:
This paper estimates country-level quality for each tradable good using Feenstra and Romalis (2014) approach and provides empirical evidences that: 1) judicial quality is positively associated with average export quality, but a country with higher judicial quality does not exhibit comparative advantage in exporting contract-intensive goods in terms of quality; 2) a country with higher judicial quality does exhibit comparative advantage in importing contract-intensive goods in terms of quality; 3) importer’s judicial quality is a key determinant of relative quality of trade for contract-intensive goods, while exporter’s judicial quality is more relevant for relative quantity of trade for contract-intensive goods.
Acemoglu,D. K., J. Robinson, and S. Johnson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation” American Economic Review, 91(5): 1369~1401.
[4]
Alessandria,George, and Joseph P. Kaboski. 2011. “Pricing-to-Market and the Failure of Absolute PPP” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(1): 91~127.
[5]
Antweiler, Werner, and Daniel Trefler. 2002. “Increasing Returns and All That: A View from Trade” American Economic Review, 92(1): 93~119.
[6]
Bartelsman, Eric J., and Wayne Gray. 1996. “The NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database” Technical Working Paper 205, National Bureau of Economic Research.
[7]
Baum,C. F., M. E. Schaffer, and S. Stillman. 2007. “Enhanced Routines for Instrumental Variables/GMM Estimation and Testing” Stata Journal, 7(4): 465~506.
[8]
Berkowitz,D., J. Moenius, and K. Pistor. 2006. “Trade, Law, and Product Complexity” Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(2): 363~373.
[9]
Essaji,A. and K. Fujiwara. 2012. “Contracting Institutions and Product Quality” Journal of Comparative Economics, 40(2): 269~278.
[10]
Feenstra,R. C., C. Hong, H. Ma, and B. J. Spencer. 2013. “Contractual versus Non-Contractual Trade: The Role of Institutions in China” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 94: 281~294.
[11]
Feenstra,Robert C. and John Romalis. 2014. “International Prices and Endogenous Quality” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2): 477~527.
[12]
Gwartney,James and Robert Lawson. 2003. “Economic Freedom of the World: 2003 Annual Report” Mimeograph, Fraser Institute.
[13]
Kaufmann,Daniel,Aart Kraay,and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2003.“Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002” World Bank Working Paper No. 3106.
[14]
Khandelwal,A.. 2010. “The Long and Short (of) Quality Ladders” Review of Economic Studies, 77(4): 1450~1476.
[15]
Levchenko,A.. 2007. “Institutional Quality and International Trade” Review of Economic Studies, 74(3): 791~819.
[16]
Ma,Y., B. Qu, and Y. Zhang. 2010. “Judicial Quality, Contract Intensity and Trade: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing and Transition Countries” Journal of Comparative Economics, 38(2): 146~159.
[17]
Manova,K. and Z. Zhang. 2012. “Export Prices Across Firms and Destinations”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1): 379~436.
[18]
Nunn,N.. 2007. “Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2): 569~600.
[19]
Nunn,N. and D. Trefler. 2014. “Domestic Institutions as a Source of Comparative Advantage” Handbook of International Economics, 4: 263~315.
[20]
Rajan,Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales. 1998. “Financial Dependence and Growth” American Economic Review, 88(3): 559~586.
[21]
Rauch,J. E.. 1999. “Networks versus Markets in International Trade” Journal of International Economics, 48(1): 7~35.
[22]
Wang,Y., Y. Wang, and K. Li. 2014. “Judicial Quality, Contract Intensity and Exports: Firm-Level Evidence” China Economic Review, 31(12): 32~42.
