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金融研究  2016, Vol. 430 Issue (4): 144-157    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
按下葫芦浮起瓢:分析师跟踪与盈余管理途径选择
李春涛, 赵一, 徐欣, 李青原
中南财经政法大学金融学院/会计学院,湖北武汉 430073;
武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉 430072
Discourage One to Encourage Another: Analysts Following and Corporate Earnings Management Strategy
LI Chuntao, ZHAO Yi, XU Xin, LI Qingyuan
School of Finance/School of Accounting and Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics & Law;
School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University
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摘要 本文使用2006-2014年的中国上市公司数据,研究了分析师跟踪对企业应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的不同作用。在控制了内生性和其它相关因素的基础上,本文发现:分析师对应计盈余管理具有监督效应,能够减少应计盈余管理;相反,其对真实盈余管理具有促进作应,跟踪分析师越多,企业真实盈余管理越多。本文对这一现象的解释是:与应计盈余管理相比,真实盈余管理具有较高的隐蔽性,分析师易于监督隐蔽性较差的应计盈余管理,这种监督迫使经理人转向真实盈余管理。本文的结论有助于全面认识和评价分析师的治理作用,指出了分析师跟踪的缺陷,为完善分析师的治理职能提供理论支持和经验证据。
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李春涛
赵一
徐欣
李青原
关键词:  分析师跟踪  应计盈余管理  真实盈余管理    
Abstract:  In the global trend of commodities financialization, commodity futures are changing to an important asset class. This paper aims to investigating investment properties of Chinese commodity futures, from aspects of risk premium, diversification and risk factors. We find that the risk premium of commodity futures is positive, supporting the normal backwardation theory. Similar to the U.S., Chinese commodity prices are positively correlated with stock prices in the last decade, indicating a weak risk diversification function. Further analyses show that inflation and business cycle comovements are the main channels of this positive correlation. In addition, risk factors, which can forecast risk premiums in the U.S. markets, do not have predictive power in Chinese markets.
Key words:  Analyst Following    Accrual Earnings Management    Real Earnings Management
JEL分类号:  D82   G24  
基金资助: 作者感谢国家自然科学基金(批准号:71372212、71402189和71272228)、教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NECT-120432)和产业升级与区域金融湖北协同创新中心对本研究的资助
通讯作者:  李青原,博士,武汉大学会计系教授,Email:qyli@whu.edu.cn.   
作者简介:  李春涛,博士,中南财经政法大学金融学院教授,Email:chtl@znufe.edu.cn.赵 一,中南财经政法大学金融学院硕士生,Email:zhaoyi23@hku.hk.徐 欣,博士,中南财经政法大学会计学院副教授,Email:xuxinfeiji@126.com.
引用本文:    
李春涛, 赵一, 徐欣, 李青原. 按下葫芦浮起瓢:分析师跟踪与盈余管理途径选择[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 430(4): 144-157.
LI Chuntao, ZHAO Yi, XU Xin, LI Qingyuan. Discourage One to Encourage Another: Analysts Following and Corporate Earnings Management Strategy. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 430(4): 144-157.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2016/V430/I4/144
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