The Optimal Financing Mode of ODI Firms in China: From the Perspectiveof Asymmetric Information
GUO Guixia, ZHAO Yue, WU Ho-Mou
Institute of International Economy, University of International Business and Economics; People's Bank of China and China Finance 40 Forum; China Europe International Business School; National School of Development, Peking University
Abstract:
Chinese ODI firms have a prominent tendency for debt financing, overreliance on which has accumulated a dangerously high level of credit risk. In this paper, based on a theoretical model of information economics, we investigate the micro-mechanism of firms’ overreliance on debt when firms have private information about their project riskiness, by analyzing the equilibrium debt level that maximizes firms’ expected profit and the socially equilibrium debt level that can maximize social welfare. It is found that the problem of debt overreliance is more severe if the financed projects are riskier, or if host country risk is higher, or if firms are imposed on a higher tax rate. Our findings are helpful to put forward useful suggestions from this respect for our financial supporting policy system to promote Chinese “Belt and Road” firms to better conduct international investments.
郭桂霞, 赵岳, 巫和懋. 我国“走出去”企业的最优融资模式选择——基于信息经济学的视角[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 434(8): 111-126.
GUO Guixia, ZHAO Yue, WU Ho-Mou. The Optimal Financing Mode of ODI Firms in China: From the Perspectiveof Asymmetric Information. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 434(8): 111-126.
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