Abstract:
This paper examines the financial market information barrier effects of the separation of ownership and control of Chinese a-share listed firms over the 2003-2013 period. The results show that the separation of cash flow rights from voting rights and the nature of controlling shareholders have positive correlation with stock price synchronicity, while ownership balance and stock price synchronicity are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the nature of state-owned company can significantly reduce the positive impact of the separation on stock price synchronicity. The separation of cash flow rights from voting rights, and state-owned and low level ownership balance will reduce the level and effectiveness of financial disclosure, so as bring about synchronicity and reduce market efficiency.
王立章, 王咏梅, 王志诚. 控制权、现金流权与股价同步性[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 431(5): 97-110.
WANG Lizhang, WANG Yongmei, WANG Zhicheng. Stock Price Synchronicity and the Separation of Ownership between Control Rights. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 431(5): 97-110.
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